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ABSTRACT 
Protests dubbed “the Arab Spring” were inspired by the revolutionary events in 
Tunisia and spread across the Middle East and North Africa while captivating the world 
through social media. A growing body of literature has emerged since 2011, analyzing 
the first revolutionary wave of the 21st century. This thesis seeks to join the conversation 
by quantifying the outcome of the Arab Spring and examining causal factors of 
revolution put forth by John Foran’s theory of third-world revolutions. The Arab 
Spring outcomes are quantified by observing the change in democratic polity of the 
countries. The presence or absence of the five causal factors are derived from the 
analysis of 15 cases of the Arab Spring that resulted in a successful social 
revolution, successful political revolution, a failed attempt at revolution, or no 
attempt at revolution at all. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the different 
outcomes are then determined using Charles Ragin’s fuzzy-set, qualitative comparison 
analysis (fsQCA) approach and a Boolean minimization technique. Finally, the 
results of the fsQCA analysis inform three case studies, which examine Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Syria, gaining an in-depth understanding of how the casual factors impacted the 
outcome of the revolutionary events in each country. 
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Any revolution which fails to realize its basic objectives inevitably lays the 
seeds for a subsequent uprising 
 —Gamal Abdel Nasser, 19551 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Arab Spring swept through the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 
unprecedented fashion. Long-standing autocrats and powerful regimes were struck to the 
core by this social movement phenomenon. Although the Middle East has been rife with 
instability and political violence, the Middle East has not seen such widespread political 
upheaval since the Arab nationalism-inspired revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
wake of the Arab Spring, regime change came quickly in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, 
monarchs in Jordan and Morocco promised reforms, but autocrats and monarchs clung to 
power everywhere else. Tunisia was unique; it was the only case where the people 
accomplished a democratic revolution. Why does Tunisia stand alone as the only real social 
revolution of the Arab Spring, while protests throughout the rest of the MENA resulted in 
political revolution, civil war, reform, or had no impact at all? 
The Arab Spring represented more than just an unravelling of the patchwork of 
states held together by autocratic dictators and external Western (and Russian) support—it 
was the first revolutionary wave in the era of social media. The revolution played itself out 
on social media in an extraordinary way, leading to such terms as “the Facebook 
Revolution” and “the Twitter Revolution” used to describe the mass collective action that 
                                                 
1 Gamal Abdel Nasser, “The Egyptian Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, January 1955, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/1955-01-01/egyptian-revolution. 
2 
gripped the MENA.2 Social media undoubtedly played an important role in the 
revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring, but to what extent?  
This thesis seeks to answer these two questions by comparing the presence and 
absence of five traits common to Third World revolutions found in John Foran’s seminal 
work Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. Foran provides a useful 
model for the analytical framework due to the commonality of cases Foran studied from 
the 20th century and the Arab Spring cases in the thesis.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES 
Question 1: Can causal factors explain why social revolution was successful in 
Tunisia, while Arab Spring-inspired protests failed to achieve similar results in other 
countries on the MENA? 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of the five traits of Foran’s model of Third World 
revolutions will explain why a social revolution succeed in Tunisia but failed in the other 
14 Arab Spring cases. 
Question 2: Did other factors that were unique to the Arab Spring, such as social 
media, play a role in the success of failure of revolutionary attempts? 
Hypothesis 2: Social media and other factors unique to the Arab Spring explain 
why the revolution spread from Tunisia and caused pre-mature revolutionary attempts in 
Egypt and Syria. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The wide breadth of literature in this thesis is designed to match the numerous 
factors and explain them in a way that reaches a broad audience, from academics to military 
leadership. A good starting point for contemporary revolution theory is Theda Skocpol’s 
States and Social Revolutions. In her comparative analysis of revolution in France, Russia, 
                                                 
2 David Talbot, “Inside Egypt’s ‘Facebook Revolution,’” MIT Technology Review, April 29, 2011, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/423884/inside-egypts-facebook-revolution/; Saleem Kassim, 
“Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media,” Mic, July 3, 2012, 
https://www.mic.com/articles/10642/twitter-revolution-how-the-arab-spring-was-helped-by-social-media. 
3 
and China, Skocpol introduced the commonly held definition of a social revolution as a 
rapid, class-based revolt that changes the political, economic, social construct of a 
country.3 In her own words, “the book was an agenda-setting book for social scientists who 
study and theorize about revolutions.”4 As a highly regarded revolution theorist, she named 
two theorists from the dozens of political scientists who based their work on her 
momentous book that stood out from the rest: John Goodwin and Timothy Wickman-
Crowley.5 
Goodwin’s study compares similarities and differences of Second World 
revolutions and Third World Revolutions using the Tocquevillian state-center approach.6 
His findings concluded that revolutionaries are most successful when the policies of 
repressive, autocratic states create social class stratification and drive the collective 
grievances of a population that otherwise would remain at a local-level.7 In Wickman-
Crowley’s study he explores the causal factors leading to the success of failure guerilla 
movements in Latin America.8 Perhaps more important to this thesis than the outcome of 
Wickman-Crowley’s study is the analytical method he used for his case: crisp-set/
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) approach, which was developed by Charles 
Ragin and outlined in Ragin’s book, The Comparative Method.9 It uses a Boolean algebra 
approach, which Ragin argues is the ideal method for case comparison with multiple 
conjunctural causations because it provides a holistic approach to compare cases with 
                                                 
3 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4. 
4 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 302. 
5 Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 304. 
6 Jeff Goodwin, “Old Regimes and Revolutions in the Second and Third Worlds: A Comparative 
Perspective,” Social Science History 18, no. 4 (1994): 575–77, https://doi.org/10.2307/1171255. 
7 Goodwin, “Old Regimes and Revolutions,” 596–597. 
8 T. P. Wickham-Crowley, “A Qualitative Comparative Approach to Latin American Revolutions,” 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 32, no. 1–2 (January 1, 1991): 82–109, https://doi.org/
10.1177/002071529103200105. 
9 Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies 
(Oakland, California: University of California Press, 1987), https://www.ucpress.edu/book/
9780520280038/the-comparative-method. 
4 
different outcomes and different combinations of conditions.10 Furthermore, Wickman-
Crowley contends that csQCA allows for researchers to closely examine the conjunctural 
and contextual aspects of revolutions that traditional research methods do not allow.11 A 
variation of the QCA approach will be used in this thesis. 
Revolution theory has developed in concert with social movement theory (SMT) 
when seeking to understand social revolutions. Like Skocpol, theorist Doug McAdam and 
his political process model has profoundly influenced structuralist approaches to SMT.12 
It argues that an insurgency’s emergence is a function of multiple internal and external 
factors timed with expanding political opportunities and increases in internal 
organizational strength, the interaction of which, in turn, helps lead to the development of 
what he calls, “cognitive liberation,” which is a group’s collective belief that together they 
can bring about desired change.13 McAdam used this model to describe the actions by the 
state and the collection action by disenfranchised African-Americas that led to the U.S. 
civil rights movement in the 1950s.14 
Building upon the work of McAdam and others, Wictorowicz argues that SMT is a 
relevant and applicable tool to analyze Islamic activism but has mostly been ignored in the 
past.15 Islamic activism has often been described as a product of single religious or socio-
economic factors, but Wictorowicz explains there are numerous factors beyond the 
traditional explanations, and SMT is the best way to frame and describe Islamic activism.16 
Borer, Everton, and Nayve used McAdam’s political process model to analyze an 
Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, and it provides a useful example of the application 
                                                 
10 Ragin, The Comparative Method, 101. 
11 Wickham-Crowley, “A Qualitative Comparative Approach,” 86. 
12 Doug. McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 40–5. 
13 McAdam, Political Process, 48–49, 51.  
14 McAdam, Political Process, 2–3. 
15 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 5–7. 
16 Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, 6–8. 
5 
using SMT to frame the analysis of an Islamic-based social movement.17 Like 
Wictorowicz, similar arguments are made by Borer, Everton, and Nayve, namely, that SMT 
is the best tool to analyze the multitude of contributing factors that allowed the Rajah 
Solaiman Islamic Movement to take root in the Philippines. This particular case study 
draws a comparison to the Arab Spring revolutions in terms of ideology.  
The Global State of Democracy Indices (GSDI) provides a way to quantify the 
outcomes of the Arab Spring-inspired social movements.18 It is used to develop a 
democratic polity rating (DPR), which is used in two ways in this thesis. First, the DPR 
helps identify whether there was a positive, neutral, or negative outcome for all 15 Arab 
Spring cases by measuring the change in the DPR from before the Arab Spring in 2009 to 
after it in 2017. Second, the DPR is used to quantify what Foran refers to as the 
authoritarian trait on a scale from 0–10;19 it is modeled after an annual report published 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit that uses a similar scoring method for the democratic 
polity.20 Unsurprisingly, many states reside in the grey area between authoritarian and 
democratic regimes and thus are better seen as “hybrid regimes.” Hybrid regimes are a 
form of government that do not fit either description of authoritarian or democratic ones, 
and are often described as semi-authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, or liberalized 
autocracies.21 
The Arab Spring protests, highlighted by social media, illuminated the growing rift 
between evolving societies in the MENA that have been subjugated by oppressive regimes 
for decades. Migdal provides a useful launching point for understanding how a large state 
                                                 
17 Douglas A Borer, Sean F Everton, and Moises M Nayve, “Global Development and Human 
(In)Security: Understanding the Rise of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and Balik Islam in the Philippines,” 
Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (February 2009): 181–204, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802622615. 
18 “Welcome to The Global State of Democracy Indices,” International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2017, https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/#/indices/world-map. 
19 A discussion of Foran’s model and the various traits it uses appears later. 
20 “Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, http://www.eiu.com/
Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy_Index_2018.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=
Democracy2018. 
21 Matthijs Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral 
Authoritarianism,” Democratization 16, no. 2 (April 2009): 399–400. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510340902777800. 
6 
in the emerging third world with substantial revenues, militaries, and bureaucracies can 
still fail to make social changes, implement policy, or exert the regional influence they seek 
to project.22 His thesis remains relevant today as it can inform on the expectations of states 
in the MENA that promise change in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
The Middle Eastern economy is dominated by oil-rich, rentier states, defined as 
states with a gross domestic product (GDP) that is 60–80% derived from external sales of 
oil and natural gas, and the profits are returned directly to the state.23 States central to 
rentier state theory (RST), such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, and Iran, redistribute their oil wealth by what Beblawi describes as “public goods 
and private favors,” a situation where the state can buy the favor of the people by providing 
societal functions of the state without taxing the people.24 Rentier states create an internal 
condition where little political competition exists so long as the external rents remain 
uninterrupted, and the state can continue to provide services and favors.25  As non-oil rich 
states, Egypt and Syria do not qualify as rentier states by definition, but due to their 
proximity to oil wealth, they extract similar rents from pipelines, the Suez Canal, economic 
aid from superpowers, and remittances from citizens working in oil-states.26 RST provides 
two useful ideas for framing the causal factors of revolution examined in this thesis. First, 
the character of rentier state inform how resource-rich countries in the MENA control who 
benefits from the wealth, resulting in highly-stratified societies. Second, in the same way 
that traditional rentier states use their oil wealth on internal control of their country, rentier 
states also spend heavily on exertion of regional power.27 Rentier state theory provides 
important context on the regional relationships can impact the success of a social 
movement. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
                                                 
22 Migdal, Joel S., Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988. 8–9. 
23 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” Arab Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4 (1987): 
386. 
24 Beblawi, “The Rentier State,’ 386–387. 
25 Beblawi, “The Rentier State,” 387. 
26 Beblawi, “The Rentier State,” 391–393. 
27 Beblawi, “The Rentier State,” 392. 
7 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) have spent millions to support Syrian opposition groups, both 
in competition with each other and to counter Iran from shifting the regional balance of 
power.28 
Revolutionaries are usually at a stark disadvantage in their nascent phases from 
effectively competing with the state to accomplish its political objective; whether or not 
they can extract resources from internal or external sources is essential to overcome this 
asymmetry, according to Weinstein.29 In concert with Weinstein, the Byman et al. study 
on “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements” provides a useful contribution 
to the types and impacts of external involvement in the modern insurgency.30 It offers 
valuable insight into interpreting the effects outside support (or lack thereof) had on 
contributing to the outcome of a revolution attempt.  
Since this thesis compares the potential causal factors in 15 different MENA 
countries, it draws on a large number of resources, such as peer-reviewed journals, 
including Arab Studies Quarterly, Foreign Affairs, and The Journal of Democracy, as well 
as economic information from reports of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, both of which are critical for evaluating two key traits in Foran’s model.  
A small but growing body of literature has been written on the Arab Spring 
revolutions to date. Critical to this thesis are three that provide different analytical 
frameworks and research approaches that provide meaningful and relevant explanations of 
the causal mechanisms of the revolutions and their historical and geopolitical importance. 
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds hypothesize an overarching framework can explain the 
political outcome of the Arab Spring revolutions through a new theory in The Arab 
Spring.31 They provide useful linkage to this thesis in that they compare regime resiliency 
                                                 
28 Emile Hokayem, “Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War,” Survival 56, no. 6 (November 2, 
2014): 59–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.985438. 
29 Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 49, no. 4 (August 2005): 598–599, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277802.  
30 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2001).  
31 Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression 
and Reform, First edition. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
8 
against internal and external factors that resulted in favorable or unfavorable (for the 
regime) political outcome. Next, Mark Lynch’s, The Arab Spring Uprisings Explained, 
builds a dynamic model for three distinct phases of the revolutions that played out in the 
various Arab Spring-inspired events: mobilization, regime response, and political 
outcomes.32 It provides interesting inferences across the spectrum of revolution during the 
Arab Spring, touching on numerous factors during each phase. Finally, Said Amir 
Arjomand’s The Arab Revolution of 2011 offers case comparison examples to place the 
importance of the Arab Spring both in historical and contemporary contexts.33  
As noted earlier, this thesis’s analytical framework is based on Foran’s model of 
third-world revolutions (see Figure 1) and Ragin’s QCA approach.34 Foran’s model was 
chosen because of the similarities between the characteristics of the cases analyzed by 
Foran and the Arab Spring cases. Contemporary revolution theorist Jack Goldstone 
describes Foran’s seminal work on revolutions as “the starting point of all future work on 
modern revolutions.”35 And Colin Beck identifies Foran’s model as one of the most robust 
analytical frameworks for theorizing about the Arab Spring, but he ultimately shies away 
from it because it does not address the interactions between the different social movements 
that could account for a “revolutionary wave.”36 While Beck builds a strong case for using 
an alternative model for analyzing the Arab Spring, this study seeks to also explain the 
transnational nature of the Arab Spring through the presence (or absence) of the conditions 
as per Foran’s model.  
Foran developed his model by theorizing that five causal factors or conditions 
preceded the successful social revolutions in Mexico (1910-20), China (1949), Cuba (1953-
                                                 
32 Marc Lynch, ed., The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East, 
Columbia Studies in Middle East Politics (West Sussex, England: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
33 Said Amir Arjomand, The Arab Revolution of 2011: A Comparative Perspective, SUNY Series, 
Pangaea II: Global/Local Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015). 
34 John Foran, Taking Power. 
35 Jack A. Goldstone, “Book Review of Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions,” 
Contemporary Sociology; Washington 36, no. 1 (January 2007): 61. 
36 Colin J. Beck, “Reflections on the Revolutionary Wave in 2011,” Theory and Society 43, no. 2 
(March 2014): 197–223, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-014-9213-8. 
9 
59), Iran (1977-79), and Nicaragua (1977-79). The conditions he identified as needing to 
be present in order for a successful social revolution to occur are (1) dependent 
development, (2) a repressive, exclusionary, personalist state, colonial state, or open polity 
(3) a political culture of opposition, combined with a revolutionary crisis caused by (4) 
economic downturns and (5) world-systemic openings.37 
 
Figure 1. Model of Third World Social Revolutions38 
Foran’s approach blends a balance of structuralist/agency approaches and 
materialistic/cultural approaches to theorizing revolutions.39 As mentioned before, Foran’s 
model and analytical approach bores similar comparison to Wickman-Crowley’s model of 
guerilla revolutions in Latin America. Comparing Wickman-Crowley’s factors with 
Foran’s model shows similarities between identified traits, but even more importantly, the 
broad applicability of Foran’s model to a multitude of revolutionary situations beyond 
guerilla movements in Latin America.40  
                                                 
37 Foran, Taking Power, 18. 
38 Adapted from John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 18, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511488979.  
39 Goldstone, “Book Review of Taking Power,” 60. 
40 Wickman-Crowley used “guerilla movement,” “peasant(worker) support,” “guerilla/military 
strength,” “patrimonial, praetorian regime,” and “government loses U.S. support” in his model. Wickham-
Crowley, “A Qualitative Comparative Approach,” 102. 
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Insights from SMT also strengths Foran’s model. One of Foran’s most potent 
arguments rests on the trait political cultures of opposition. Foran’s analysis of this trait is 
similar to the McAdam’s notion of “indigenous organizational strength,” but it includes a 
cultural aspect to his analysis. And Foran’s world-systemic opening trait is analogous to 
McAdam’s concept of  “expanding political opportunities,” albeit at more international 
level.  
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The design of the research methodology aimed to quantify the outcome of the Arab 
Spring, test Hypothesis 1 using an adapted model of revolution, and then use case study 
analysis to better understand how the model explains success or failure of social revolution 
attempts and to test Hypothesis 2.  
1. Measuring Success with the Democratic Polity Rating 
The GSDI provides a way to quantify the outcomes of the Arab Spring-inspired 
social movements in the Middle East.41 The International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) rates a country’s level of democracy using five main 
categories and 16 sub-categories that take into account a total of 97 indicators of 
democracy. Categories and sub-categories are based on a 0–1 scale where 1 indicates the 
highest possible score for a category or sub-category, and an aggregate score ranging from 
0 to 1 is assigned to four of the main attributes of democracy: representative government, 
fundamental rights, checks on government, and impartial administration. IDEA does not 
generate a total score for its fifth category, participatory engagement, because the sub-
categories, although relevant to democratic institutions, do not demonstrate a statistically 
significant relationship with the primary category.42 Since the index only scores by 
categories, an overall DPR on a 0–10 scale was created using a weighted average of each 
of the four main categories plus four sub-categories of participatory engagement, which 
                                                 
41 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of Democracy.” 
42 For example, the sub-attribute direct democracy scores relatively low (less than .17) in Norway, 
which is arguably the purest form of democracy in the world. Furthermore, in countries like the United 
States, which are structured around indirect democracy, score 0.0 in this sub-category.  
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were weighted individually. The categories were weighted based on the descriptions of the 
categories provided by IDEA with the intent of determining if a social revolution took place 
or not. 
The IDEA team identified representative government as the single most important 
factor of the five categories because it represents the presence of “contested and inclusive 
popular elections for legislative and directly or indirectly elected executives.”43 Thus, it 
was weighted the most. Second was the category of fundamental rights, which draws 
heavily on the presence of economic, social, and cultural rights.44 This category reflects 
the societal and economic elements Skocpol says must be addressed in addition to regime 
change for an event to be classified as a social revolution. Therefore, it was weighed second 
only to representative government. The remaining categories—checks on government, 
impartial administration, and participatory engagement—possessed no distinguishing 
factors to weight one higher than the other, so they were weighted equally but less than 
representative government and fundamental rights. The calculation of the DPR is as 
follows: 
Democratic Polity Rating = Representative Government (4) + Fundamental 
Rights (3) + Checks on Government (1) + Impartial Administration (1) + 
Participatory Engagement (Local Democracy (.25) + Direct Democracy 
(.25) + Electoral Participation (.25) + Civil Society Participation (.25)) 
When a state loosens its control and power shifts toward the people, a positive trend 
in the DPR occurs, but when a state retains more power a negative trend appears. No change 
in DPR over time indicate that there has been no change in a society’s power structures. 
Another assumption is that the DRP threshold for liberal democracy is 6.0. A country 
cannot cross that threshold without a government structure that places a majority of power 
within a democratically-elected entity. This threshold is based on an annual report 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit that uses a similar scoring method for the 
democratic polity, which labels countries with a score of 0–3.99 as authoritative, 4.0-5.99 
                                                 
43 “About Us,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, https://www.idea.int/
about-us. 
44 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
12 
as a hybrid regime, 6.0-7.99 as a flawed democracy, and 8.0-10 as a full democracy.45 As 
noted earlier, a hybrid regime is a form of government that does not fit either description 
of authoritarian or democratic, and often described as semi-authoritarian, competitive 
authoritarian, or a liberalized autocracy.46 In this study, states are classified as either 
authoritative-leaning (4.0-4.99) or democratic-leaning (5.0-5.99) based on the 
corresponding DPR score.  
To test the DPR’s validity, correlations are estimated between the passage of time 
and trends toward liberalization for both long-term cases (over 30 years) and short-term 
cases (less than eight years) with known outcomes. If the DPR is valid, there should be a 
large correlation between the two for cases where there is strong trend toward 
liberalization, a moderate correlation for a moderate trend, no correlation when there is no 
change, and a negative correlation for cases where there a trend away from liberalization. 
The process is repeated for the cases in this study to first characterize a country’s long term 
tend towards liberalization prior to the Arab Spring (1975-2009), as well as another to 
examine the short-term period after the Arab Spring (2009-2017). The purpose for the long-
term analysis is to provide context to understanding if the Arab Spring a country’s relation 
with liberalization prior to the Arab Spring. If a country’s correlation indicates little change 
between the pre- and post-Arab Spring, then it is assumed that the event had little impact.  
For this study, a democratic reform constitutes situations where democratic reforms 
are passed that result in a positive change in DPR of a country in the years after the reform, 
but remain a hybrid-regime. The reform is only a minor success because although the 
country is on the pathway toward liberalization, there is no empirical evidence to suggest 
hybrid-regimes are a stepping stone toward full democracy.47 Democratization or 
revolution considered successes are those that transition from an authoritative or hybrid 
regime to either a flawed or full democracy. Negative outcomes are characterized by an 
                                                 
45 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2018: Me Too?”  
46 Matthijs Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral 
Authoritarianism,” Democratization 16, no.2 (April 2009):399-400, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510340902777800. 
47  Bogaards, “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes,” 404. 
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adverse change in the DPR scale or in democratic cases where a positive trend toward 
liberalization caused by a revolutionary event followed by a reversal of the positive gains. 
Using these indicators, the DPR is operationalized to describe the success or failure of the 
Arab Spring on democratic reform and revolution by comparing the trend toward 
liberalization before the Arab Spring (1975-2009) and post-Arab Spring (2009-2017).  
2. Analytical Method 
The analytical approach used in this thesis is Ragin’s QCA method. Similar to 
Wickman-Crowley and Foran, causal factors are listed in columns with a corresponding 
letter (A,B,C,D,E) and each case (a country that experience a revolutionary situation) is 
listed along the rows to produce a truth table. The table is filled out with a “1” if a trait is 
present and a “0” if a trait is absent. This thesis expands upon the framework by introducing 
fuzzy-set data. Fuzzy-sets provide a solution for coding traits that are difficult to classify 
simply as “0” for absent or “1” for present by allowing the use of continuous and/or interval 
data in addition to the dichotomous variables.48 Ragin and Davy’s computer program, 
fuzz-set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) calibrates continuous or interval 
values data sets into a 0–1 range.49 Calibration thresholds are set by the researcher based 
on the values of the scale being calibrated that the researcher determines equate to full non-
membership (fs= .05), the crossover point (fs=.5), and full membership (fs=.95) of the 
trait.50 The dependent variable used to test the first hypothesis is the success or failure of 
social revolution, coded dichotomously as “1” for success and “0” for failure. Cases are 
organized into four categories (successful social revolution, attempted social revolution, 
political revolution, and no attempt at revolution),51 based on the observed change in the 
                                                 
48 Charles C. Ragin, User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0 (Irvine, 
California: Department of Sociology, University of California, 2018), http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/
fsQCA/software.shtml. 
49 Charles C. Ragin and Sean Davey, Fuzzy-Set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis, version 3.0, Mac 
(Irvine California: Department of Sociology, University of California, 2016). 
50 Ragin, User’s Guide to Fuzzy-Set, 13–14. 
51 None of the Arab Spring cases fit the reversed social movement case, so this category was excluded 
from the research. 
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democratic polity, the observed level of collective action, and whether political, social, and 
economic change occurred.  
Foran defines a successful social revolution using Theda Skocpol’s conditions for 
revolution. He points out that Skocpol’s definition lacks an emphasis on mass collective 
action, so he adds it as a necessary condition for a successful social revolution.52 A political 
revolution is defined as only meeting the political transformation found in Skocpol’s 
definition, less the social and economic transformation associated with social 
revolutions.53 Failed attempts at social revolutions are defined as when one or more 
conditions for revolution exists and mass mobilization takes place, but no transformation 
of the political or social climate occurs.54 Finally, no attempt at revolution cases are those 
where conditions for revolution were present, but mass mobilization failed to materialize.55  
Only cases where mass collective action occurred could be categorized as a social, 
attempted, or political revolution in keeping with Foran’s emphasis on mass collective 
action. Cases, where only significant or isolated protests occurred, are categorized as no 
attempts at revolution. Furthermore, the outcome is also described as either a social 
revolution, oppression, civil war, coup, stability, or minor reform to enable a more in-depth 
analysis of the cases. 
Once the data are entered, the fsQCA program produces a truth table and provides 
a solution whether the presence of each of the five traits help lead to a successful social 
revolution. The rest of the cases are grouped together based on the combination of presence 
or absence of traits, producing a set of letters corresponding to the traits. A letter is 
capitalized to represent the presence of a trait, while non-capitalization indicates the  
absence of a trait. Boolean minimization was applied to reduce the results down to patterns 
that describe the necessary and sufficient traits of the different outcomes. Necessary means 
the trait is a required part of the solution for the corresponding outcome. Sufficient means 
                                                 
52 Foran, Taking Power, 7 
53 Foran, Taking Power, 8 
54 Foran, Taking Power, 8 
55 Foran, Taking Power, 8 
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the trait alone will result in the outcome. For this analysis, I anticipate finding a 
combination of necessary traits that are sufficient for an outcome, since we can likely rule 
out the presence of a single trait being sufficient in and of itself, given the results of Foran’s 
study. Once the sets of traits necessary for an outcome are derived, I compare the results 
to the patterns that Foran found in his study. This comparison further will either validate 
or invalidate the applicability of Foran’s model to the Arab Spring cases. 
3. Foran’s Model of Third World Revolutions 
Foran tested his theory using csQCA and found the presence of all five of his traits 
were necessary for a social revolution to be successful in the cases he tested. However, one 
or more either changed (e.g., present to absent) or did not exist in the counter-cases (see 
Table 1). Furthermore, his analysis identified the necessary conditions when revolutions 
revert, failed, only resulted in regime change, or failed to materialize altogether. 
Replicating a qualitative analysis can be difficult because much of it is subjective by nature. 
Defining the key terms Foran used in his model is an important step, as this explains how 
the researcher will analyze the data.  
As noted previously, Foran identified five traits that need to be present in order for 
a successful social revolution to occur: (1) dependent development, (2) a repressive, 
exclusionary, personalist state, colonial state, or open polity (3) a political culture of 
opposition, combined with a revolutionary crisis caused by (4) economic downturns and 
(5) world-systemic openings. He based his dependent development trait on Cardoso and  
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Legend: (1) represents the presence of a trait; (0) represents the absence of a trait; (1*) represents 
an open polity; (1-) represents a partial presence of the trait; (1+) represents growing economies 
that no longer fit the dependent development description; and any number combination with a 
backslash (#/#) represents a change in the trait during the time period 
                                                 
56 Source: Foran. Taking Power, 248–249. 
17 
Faletto’s research, which characterized dependent development in third-world South 
American countries as the rapid growth of an economy and combined with negative aspects 
of inflation, external debt, and social issues that leads to a significant disparity in the class 
structure.57 An elite class forms at the core of the resource-rich but industry-poor countries 
where external trade is incentivized over internal development.58 
Dictatorships, whether a monarchy or patriarchal dynasty, often accompanies 
dependent development and typifies Foran’s “repressive, exclusionary, personalist state” 
characteristic.59 Foran also adds to this trait that colonial states, or truly open polities where 
revolutionaries can use free elections to accomplish their objectives can substitute for a 
dictatorship in what he refers to as a “vulnerable state”.60 Since none of the cases selected 
in this research are qualify as either colonial or open polities, these two characteristics are 
omitted. The “repressive, exclusionary, personalist” trait is retitled in this thesis simply as 
authoritarian, measured by the corresponding DPR score for 2009. The DPR score 
strengthens the model by providing a method to quantify this trait instead of only coding 
the trait as absent or present. 
The trait, political cultures of opposition, adds a cultural element to Foran’s 
approach to theorizing revolution and describes how diverse groups come together to 
challenge the state. He frames it (Figure 2) in such a way that it demonstrates the interaction 
of different social groups and their organizational capacity, life experiences, culture, and 
ideology that results in a collective opposition toward the government.61  
                                                 
57 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of 
Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
58 Cal Clark and Donna Bahry, “Dependent Development: A Socialist Variant,” International Studies 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 273, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600684.  
59 Foran, Taking Power, 20. 
60 Foran, Taking Power, 21. 
61 Foran, Taking Power, 22. 
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*Dotted line indicates indirect linkage. 
Figure 2. The Role of Culture in the Making of Revolutions62 
While the internal traits of dependent development and authoritarian can be 
described through facts, figures, and numbers, political cultures of opposition are clearly 
difficult to quantify. The first step involved determining whether a mass collective action 
occurred and if protesters made revolutionary demands. If these two elements existed, then 
the case is analyzed using Foran’s model for the role of culture in making of revolutions 
(Figure 2) to determine if in fact there was a cross-class, organized revolutionary group 
with shared experiences and common ideology. In some cases, the political culture of 
opposition existed, but the organization breaks down because of actions by the state or 
internal friction. These cases are coded as present and then absent, as a -1 in the truth table. 
Foran argues that economic downturn precedes nearly every successful revolution, 
whether it be a global phenomenon such as the 1975 oil crisis and recession, internal strife 
such as the 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua, or Castro’s attack on the Cuban sugar industry 
in 1958.63 The 2008 world-wide recession may seem like a clear example of the economic 
downturn on the eve of the Arab Spring, Colin Beck’s analysis using GDP growth as a 
measure of economic strain was incorporated in this model, providing a quantitative, fuzzy-
set of data rather than a dichotomous 1 or 0.  
Finally, Foran describes world-systemic openings as any situation where the normal 
relationship between a country in question and either a major world power or an ally, is 
                                                 
62 Adapted from Foran, Taking Power, 22.  
63 Foran, Taking Power, 22–23. 
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disrupted or changes in a way that creates an opportunity for revolutionaries.64 If evidence 
was found of a major external change that supported the revolutionaries then the trait was 
coded with a 1 and if no evidence was found then a 0. In some cases, a world-systemic 
opening was initially present, such as foreign support to the opposition, but the opening 
did not actually benefit the revolutionaries, so in such cases, they are coded 1/0. 
4. Case Study Analysis  
This thesis uses case study analysis to test Hypothesis 2. In particular, an in-depth 
analysis of the traits of Third World revolutions is conducted on three of the fifteen cases: 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. Tunisia is used because it was the only successful social 
revolution. And while Egypt and Syria initially appeared to be the most likely candidates 
for a successful social revolution, they ultimately failed. The revolutionary situations 
developed quickly after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, and both shared similar geopolitical 
histories, but they ended in political revolution/coup and civil war. The goal of the case 
studies is to derive salient points of the necessary factors to test Hypothesis 2. Finally, the 
relevance of the research and the applicability of revolution and social movement theory 
to military doctrine are discussed. 
E. RESEARCH INTENT 
This thesis seeks to provide a new understanding of the Arab Spring revolutions 
not previously explored by previous studies. With a growing body of literature on the Arab 
Spring, such a phenomenon in the 21st century remains under-studied and sometimes 
misunderstood. The intent of this thesis to provide a meaningful contribution to the 
expanding conversation on the Arab Spring by conducting a study in a new and insightful 
way.  
In addition, it is designed to reach military readership with a specific professional 
interest in unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN). The U.S. 
military’s formative doctrine, Army Field Manual and No. 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication No.3-33.5, “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies” (FM 3-24/MCWP 3–
                                                 
64 Foran, Taking Power, 23. 
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33.5), provides our military leadership with the collective base of knowledge on the 
subject.65 It falls short in one key area, however: understanding the root cause of an 
insurgency, which is touted as one of the first and most important steps in FM 3-24. In fact, 
FM 3-24 identifies three prerequisites—opportunity, motive, and means—as the 
framework for military planners to understand how an insurgency foments into collective 
action.66 This approach oversimplifies the critical understanding of how a social 
movement emerges, an understanding that is necessary for a UW or COIN campaign to be 
successful. This thesis seeks to provide an answer to this doctrinal gap by demonstrating 
the applicability of Foran’s model of third world revolutions to extract and analyze the 
underlying factors that enable social movements to challenge a state. 
                                                 
65 See Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24, MCWP 3–33.5 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014). 
66Department of the Army,  Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 4–3. 
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II. QUANTIFYING THE OUTCOMES OF THE ARAB SPRING 
The Arab Spring resulted in several different outcomes from social revolution 
success in Tunisia, to civil war in Syria, to no effect on Saudi Arabia and Algeria. A data 
set is operationalized to capture the different outcomes in this chapter that correlates to the 
DPR of the country. The DPR informs two research priorities, first by providing a 
dependent variable that can be measured in this chapter, and in a later chapter a way to 
measure how authoritarian a state is concerning the causal factors from Foran’s model of 
third world revolutions.  
A. TESTING THE DEMOCRATIC POLITY RATING 
Studying historical events with known outcomes help validate the integrity of the 
model and the DPR by studying historical events with known outcomes. To test the DPR’s 
validity, correlations were estimated for historical cases to determine the relationship 
between the passage of time and trends towards or away from liberalization. As mentioned 
before, the assumption is if the DPR is valid, there should be a large positive correlation 
between the two for cases where there is a strong trend towards liberalization, a strong 
negative correlation when there is a trend away from liberalization, and no correlation if 
there is no trend in either direction. Moderate trends should produce a moderate correlation 
with respect to positive and negative events, while countries that experience both positive 
and negative events over the time period tested should have a weak correlation at best. To 
test the long-term correlation, 22 cases were tested to compare against the 35-year time 
period before the Arab Spring for the 15 cases in this thesis. To gain a better understanding 
of how specific events correlate to the DPR in the short-term, similar to the post-Arab 
Spring time period, 33 cases were test ranging from a 3 to 17-year period.  
For the long-term cases (Table 2), the results were generally as predicted for the positive 
cases. Canada, Costa Rica, the United States, and Norway were tested as all four countries 
are committed to upholding democracy, as well as exhibiting domestic stability for the 
period analyzed here. The democratic institutions that are rooted in both countries are 
reflected in their mean DPR from 1975–2000: 7.73 for Canada, 7.96 for Costa Rice, 8.58 
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for Norway, and 7.89 for the U.S. The correlation estimated for all four countries was large 
(beta > .80)  and statistically significant (p < .05). Of the five cases successful cases, three 
countries from the 1989 democratic revolutions, Albania, Poland, and Romania, as well as, 
Taiwan and South Africa that liberalized through democratic reforms. All five cases 
resulted in statically significant, large correlations. The final six positive cases were 
classified as minor successes with the DPR reflecting a medium to large, positive 
correlation.  
 
Table 2. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time of 
Historical Case67 
Country/Time Period Beta p-Value Event  Outcome 
Change in 
Government* 
Canada/1975-2009 0.97 p < .05 Stable Democracy No Change D 
Costa Rica/1975-2009 0.91 p < .05 Stable Democracy No Change D 
Norway/1975-2009 0.90 p < .05 Stable Democracy No Change D 
United States/1975-2009 0.88 p < .05 Stable Democracy No Change FD 
Albania/1975-2009 0.92 p < .05 Democratic Revolution Success AFD 
Poland/1975-2009 0.89 p < .05 Democratic Revolution Success AFD 
Romania/1975-2009 0.90 p < .05 Democratic Revolution Success AFD 
Taiwan/1975-2009 0.99 p < .05 Democratization Success AFD 
South Africa/1975-2009 0.91 p < .05 Democratization  Success AFD 
El Salvador/1975-2009 0.92 p < .05 Civil War/Democratic Reform 
Minor 
Success ADHR 
Liberia/1975-2009 0.66 p < .05 Civil War/Democratic Reform 
Minor 
Success ADHR 
Mexico/1975-2009 0.95 p < .05 Democratic Reform Minor Success ADHR 
Philippines/1975-2009 0.81 p < .05 Political Revolution Minor Success ADHR 
Jordan/1975-2009 0.79 p < .05 Democratic Reform by Monarchy 
Minor 
Success AAHR 
Algeria/1975-2009 0.78 p < .05 Civil War/Democratic Reform 
Minor 
Success AAHR 
                                                 
67 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
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Country/Time Period Beta p-Value Event  Outcome 
Change in 
Government* 
Bahrain/1975-2009 0.73 p < .05 Democratic Reform by Monarchy Failure AA 
DR Congo/1975-2009 0.25 0.14 Civil War/Democratic Reform Failure AA 










Thailand/1975-2017 0.34 p < .05 Democratic Regression Failure DHRA 
Turkey/1975-2017 0.32 p < .05 Democratic Regression Failure FDDHR 
Venezuela/1975-2017 -0.90 p < .05 Democratic Regression Failure FDA 
Legend: *D=Democracy (8.0-10.00), FD = Flawed Democracy (6.0-7.99), DHR= Democratic-leaning 
Hybrid Regime (5.0-5.99), Authoritative-leaning Hybrid Regime (4.0-4.9), Authoritarian (0-3.99)  
 
The failure cases produced interesting results as well but require more context to 
understand the correlation. For example, both Bahrain and Russia have moderate positive 
correlations but are authoritative regimes. Both liberalized to a degree, moving from 
authoritative to hybrid regimes, a minor success, but later regressed back towards 
authoritative. China also has a medium correlation of 0.55, but further examination shows 
the actual rate of change to be marginal and liberalization at the current rate would take 
centuries. Thailand, Turkey, and DR Congo have weak, positive correlations. Thailand and 
Turkey have both undergone multiple coups and transfers of power, while DR Cong has 
been ravished by war and attempts at civil governance, that results significant fluctuations 
in the DPR over time which is reflected in the low correlation. Finally, Venezuela has a 
large, negative correlation that coincides with the rise of the socialist government under 
Hugo Chavez and his successes that saw a democracy in Latin American turn authoritative 
of its modern history.  
To test the DPR against specific events over a short time period, similar to the Arab 
Spring, 33 events were chosen based on positive events towards liberalization, negative 
events away from liberalization, and sustained political violence (war, civil war, foreign 
intervention). Unsurprisingly, positive events towards liberalization, such as democratic 
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reforms, and political revolutions (democratic) resulted in a significantly significant, large 
correlation between the DPR and the years after the event (see Table 3). Landmark 
elections had less significant findings, but still had a medium, positive correlation. The 
correlation for negative events suggests that the a medium to large negative correlation 
exists DPR trends when there is a reversal in liberalization, such as military coups, 
consolidation of power by the government, or when election results are canceled (see Table 
4). The results from the cases of sustained political violence showed a much weaker 
relationship between time and DPR during conflict (see Table 5). Results range from large, 
negative correlations such as during the Lebanese Civil War to a large, positive correlation 
as in the case of the Salvadorian Civil War. Much of this variation is to be expected, as 
wars unfold in a variety way, in numerous types of conflict. The interaction between the 
state and the people over power may be unique to each instance of sustained political 
violence. The civil wars that tear one country like in Lebanon, might ultimately bring pave 
the way for liberalization in places like El Salvador or Liberia. Wars in Afghanistan replace 
a dictator by that of another name, while the people might collectively rally behind their 
leader in a time of crisis in a country like Iran. 
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Table 3. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time during 
Positive Events Toward Liberalization68 
Country/Year Beta p-Value Event 
South Africa/1993-1997 0.87 0.33 1994 Major Democratic Reforms 
El Salvador/1991-1996 0.88 p < .05 1992 Major Democratic Reforms 
Jordan/1987-1994 0.84 p < .05 1993 Minor Democratic Reforms 
Bahrain/2000-2005 0.88 p < .05 2001 Minor Democratic Reforms 
Albania /1988-1993 0.93 p < .05 1989 Political Revolution 
Bulgaria/1988-1993 0.87 p < .05 1989 Political Revolution 
Hungary/1988-1993 0.85 p < .05 1989 Political Revolution 
Romania/1988-1993 0.91 p < .05 1989 Political Revolution 
DR Congo/2005-2009 0.79 0.11 2006 Landmark Elections 
Liberia/2004-2009 0.78 0.07 2005 Landmark Elections 
 
Table 4. Change in DPR (β1) during Negative Events Toward 
Liberalization69 
Country/Year Beta P-Value Event 
Liberia/1978-1983 -0.92 p < .05 1979 Military Coup 
El Salvador/1978-1981 -0.93 0.07 1979 Military Coup 
Turkey/1979-1981 -0.98 0.13 1980 Military Coup 
Algeria/1990-1994 -0.88 p < .05 1991 Military Coup 
Thailand/2005-2007 -0.99 p < .05 2006 Military Coup 
Thailand/2013-2017 -0.76 0.13 2014 Military Coup 
Zaire/1991-1996 -0.84 p < .05 Cancelled Elections 
                                                 
68 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
69 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ve, “The Global State 
of Democracy.” 
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Country/Year Beta P-Value Event 
Venezuela/1998-2006 -0.91 p < .05 Consolidation of Power 
Russia/1999-2008 -0.93 p < .05 Consolidation of Power 
Turkey/2013-2017 -0.99 p < .05 Consolidation of Power 
 
Mexico’s pathway toward liberalization (Figure 3) is a critical case to demonstrate the 
validity of the DPR. In the 1970s, Mexico experimented with increased state-intervention 
and (attempted to) control its economy in response to financial crisis and growing socio-
economic divide.70 Mexico’s policies only alienated the private-sector and significantly 
increased foreign debt that culminated with the 1982 financial crisis.71 Ultimately the 
decade of economic turmoil led to Mexico adopting a neoliberalism strategy to decrease 
the growing economic and social problems that plagued the country. The shift in policy 
also reflects a positive trend in liberalization, as demonstrated by a positive trend in DPR 
seen through the 1980s. The first two significant events were the Economic Solidary Act 
in 1987 that pledged privatization and deregulation of business, and the 1992 land reforms 
that protected the rights of private citizens and corporations in landholding under Article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution.72 While these actions were designed to address the social 
and economic issues, true democratization would require political change as well. The 
1997 congressional elections followed by the 2000 Presidential elections ended the 83 
years of control by the Mexican elite.73 The 1997 elections have been described as “the 
threshold of democracy,” followed by the 2000 elections that let Mexico “leave behind the 
                                                 
70 Adam David Morton, “Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico: ‘Passive Revolution’ in the 
Global Political Economy,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 4 (August 2003): 637–638, https://doi.org/
10.1080/0143659032000105795. 
71 Morton, “Structural Change and Neoliberalism,” 639. 
72 Morton, “Structural Change and Neoliberalism,” 640; Michael W. Foley, “Privatizing the 
Countryside: The Mexican Peasant Movement and Neoliberal Reform,” Latin American Perspectives 22, 
no. 1 (1995): 59–76. 
73 Daniel C. Levy, Kathleen Bruhn, and Emilio Zebadúa, Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic 
Development, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), xvi. 
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old authoritarianism and begin to build real democracy.”74 Mexico crossing the threshold 
from authoritative to democratic is mirrored in the change of DPR as the 1997 elections 
correspond with a change in DPR from 4.86 in 1996 to 5.18 in 1997 and 2000 presidential 
elections show a jump in DPR to 5.93. These events further support the integrity of the 
DPR model. 
 
Table 5. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time during 
Sustained Political Violence75 
Country/Year Beta P-Value Event 
Lebanon/1975-1990 -0.88 p < .05 Lebanese Civil War 
Iran/1980-1988 -0.08 0.83 Iran-Iraq War 
Iraq/1980-1988 0.50 0.16 Iran-Iraq War 
Algeria/1991-2003 0.52 0.07 Algerian Civil War 
Liberia/1989-1996 -0.42 0.29 First Liberian Civil War 
Liberia/1999-2003 -0.69 0.2 Second Liberian Civil War 
El Salvador/1979-1992 0.85 p < .05 Salvadorian Civil War 
DR Congo/ 1996–2003 0.73 p < .05 Series of Wars 
Bosnia and Herzegovina/
1992-1995 -0.71 0.28 Bosnian War 
Afghanistan/1989-1992 -0.97 p < .05 Afghan Civil War 
Afghanistan/1996-2001 0.70 0.11 Afghan Civil War 
Afghanistan/2001-2017 0.69 p < .05 Foreign Intervention 
Iraq/2003-2011 0.73 p < .05 Foreign Intervention 
 
                                                 
74 Levy, Bruhn, and Zebadúa, “Mexico: The Struggle,” xvi. 




Figure 3. Mexico’s Pathway to Democratization, 1975–200976 
The democratic reforms in Jordan and Bahrain (see Table 3) are useful cases as they 
demonstrate how swift democratic reforms in autocratic, Arab countries that liberalize (to a 
degree) to pacify their population. The estimated correlation during the five-year periods in 
which the democratic reforms took place provides a useful measure in determining the effect 
of democratic reforms that took place during the Arab Spring. Also, the democratic reforms 
demonstrate that more action is required for a country to cross the threshold of democracy 
reflected by analyzing the effects of these reforms in the context of a longer time period (See 
Table 2). This means it would take decades of unimpeded progress to transform these 
countries into democracies. 
B. THE ARAB SPRING AND THE DEMOCRATIC POLITY RATING 
Scatter plots (Figures 4 and 5) depicting the DPR for each country that experienced 
some level of protest between 2010–2012 illustrates the Arab Spring’s effect on 
liberalization.77 When comparing the results between monarchies (Figure 4) and 
authoritative countries (Figure 5), an apparent trend stands out; authoritative regimes 
experienced the most change (+/-) in democratic reform, while monarchies, for the most part, 
                                                 
76 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
77 Iraq was omitted because it was the only country that experienced a significant level of internal 
violence leading up to the Arab Spring 
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maintained the status quo. While there were some positive trends toward liberalization 
amongst the monarchies, notably in Morocco and Jordan, there were no dramatic changes 
seen in these countries, suggesting that the Arab Spring had substantially less impact on 
monarchies versus authoritative regimes (see Tables 6–9).  
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia all demonstrated a degree of negative 
correlation between the DPR and the post-Arab Spring years, suggesting the governments 
made some efforts to stifle the movement in reaction to the protests. The large, positive 
correlations for Jordan and Morocco support the promised reforms by the monarchs in the 
wake of the movement. Oman and UAE had the most surprising results. Little has been 
promised by the monarchies in these countries, yet the DPR correlation remains large. By 
returning to the long-term correlations for the countries (Table 8), it becomes evident that the 
Arab Spring had no impact in these countries because the correlation remains constant, 
signifying their relative stability. 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have stayed within a 0.5 DPR tolerance as highly authoritative 
regimes over 42 years in this study. The negative trend post-Arab Spring shows the social 
movement served as a setback for reform to take place in light of the protests. This negative 
trend is evident in the reversal of DPR gains made after Bahrain’s democratic reforms in 2002 
that transformed the most autocratic monarchy in the Middle East of six to the third most. 
This positive trend in liberalization lasted until the Arab Spring protests, which have set 
Bahrain on course to retake its place as the most authoritative monarch, second only to Saudi 
Arabia by a slim margin (less than 0.1 different in democratic polity).  
30 
 
Figure 4. Change in DPR, Monarchies, 2009–201778 
 
Figure 5. Change in DPR, Authoritative Regimes, 2009–201779 
Authoritative regimes saw the most significant changes in DPR post-Arab Spring. 
Tunisia is the only successful cases as the democratic revolution that took place in 2011 is 
supported by the medium, positive correlation and the DPR crossing the threshold of a flawed 
democracy (DPR > 6.0) after the revolution. Lebanon crossed the threshold to a democratic-
leaning hybrid regime in 2009, but the small correlation suggests the Arab Spring had no 
                                                 
78 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
79 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
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effect in the country. Compared to the rest of the Middle East, not regressing to an 
authoritative state should be seen as a success for Lebanon, but for this study, it is labeled a 
failure. Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen all experienced mass protests and collective action 
during the Arab Spring that led to the ousting of the sitting regimes, except Syria, where the 
regime remains contested to date. Egypt experienced a short-lived stint with democracy before 
a military coup ousted the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in 2013. Egypt experience a positive 
trend toward liberalization after Mubarak was ousted in 2011, and democratic elections were 
held the following year, but the 2013 coup reversed all progress made toward liberalization. 
Libya followed a similar path as Egypt, showing initial progress toward liberalization, but the 
country descended into civil war resulting in a reversal of gains. Yemen and Syria also 
descended into civil war post-Arab Spring but resulted in a negative trend toward 
liberalization in these two countries. Finally, Algeria demonstrated no significant positive or 
negative linear relationship, similar to Saudi Arabia, signaling the Arab Spring had no impact 
on liberalization in the country in either direction.  
 
Table 6. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time of Arab 
Authoritative States, 1975–200980 
 
                                                 
80 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
Country Beta P-Value Event Outcome Regime Change 
Algeria 0.78 p < .05 Civil War Minor Success AAHR 
Egypt -0.21 0.213 Stability Failure AA 
Lebanon 0.85 p < .05 Civil War/Elections Minor Success ADHR 
Libya 0.71 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Syria 0.88 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Tunisia 0.20 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Yemen 0.87 p < .05 Civil War/Elections Failure AA 
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Table 7. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time of Arab 
Authoritative States, Post-Arab Spring81 
 
Table 8. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time of Arab 
Monarchies, 1975–200982 
Country Beta P-Value Event Outcome Regime Change 
Bahrain 0.73 p < .05 Democratic Reforms Failure AA 
Jordan 0.79 p < .05 Democratic Reforms 
Minor 
Success AAHR 
Kuwait 0.69 p < .05 Stability Failure AHR AHR 
Morocco 0.86 p < .05 Stability Minor Success AAHR 
Oman 0.86 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Qatar 0.93 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Saudi Arabia 0.86 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
UAE 0.97 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
                                                 
81 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
82 Adapted from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “The Global State of 
Democracy.” 
Country/ Year Beta P-Value Event Outcome Regime Change 
Algeria/2009-2017 0.43 0.25 Stability Failure AHR 
Egypt/ 2009–2012 0.86 0.14 Political Revolution 
Minor 
Success AAHR 
Egypt/ 2012–2017 0.45 .37 Military Coup Failure AHRA 
Lebanon/ 2009–
2017 0.15 0.69 Stability Failure DHR DHR 
Libya/2009-2013 0.90 p < .05 Political Revolution 
Minor 
Success AAHR 
Libya/2013-2017 -0.72 .18 Civil War Failure AHRA 
Syria/ 2009–2017 -0.86 p < .05 Civil War Failure AA 
Tunisia/2009-2017 0.78 p < .05 Social Revolution Success AFD 
Yemen/2009-2013 0.63 .26 Political Revolution Failure AA 
Yemen/2014-2017 -0.96 p < .05 Civil War Failure AA 
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Table 9. Estimated Correlation between DPR and Time of Arab 
Monarchies, 2009–201783 
Country Beta P-Value Event Outcome Regime Change 
Bahrain -0.92 p < .05 Oppression Failure AA 
Jordan 0.84 p < .05 Democratic Reforms 
Minor 
Success AHRAHR 
Kuwait -0.42 p < .05 Stability Failure AHRAHR 
Morocco 0.95 p < .05 Democratic Reforms 
Minor 
Success AHRDHR 
Oman 0.78 p < .05 Stability Failure AAHR 
Qatar -0.84 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
Saudi 
Arabia -0.55 0.119 Stability Failure AA 
UAE 0.94 p < .05 Stability Failure AA 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter tested the validity and operationalized the DPR to describe 
the success or failure of the Arab Spring on democratic reforms. The DPR was tested by 
estimating correlations for historical cases to determine the relationship between the 
passage of time and trends toward or away from liberalization. The results of the analysis 
support the assumption that if the DPR is valid, then positive and negative toward or away 
from liberalization should correlate to a positive or negative trend in DPR over time. By 
comparing the correlations for the 15 cases examined in this thesis, this chapter backs that 
Tunisia was the only successful social revolution of the Arab Spring, while Jordan and 
Morocco were minor success for the democratic reforms passed in these countries. The 
chapter also finds that the Arab Spring failed to have a positive impact on the other 12 
cases. This was explained by either a negative or weaker correlation estimated when 
comparing correlations before and after the Arab Spring. The results of this chapter are 
used in the following chapter to support the dependent variable in the fsQCA analysis and 
provide a measure for how authoritarian a state concerning the causal factors from Foran’s 
model of Third World revolutions. 
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III. A THEORY OF REVOLUTION AND THE ARAB SPRING 
This chapter builds closely upon Foran’s analysis to determine if the same (or 
similar) patterns of conditions existed in the Arab Spring revolutions. The resulting model 
will then be used to guide the case study comparisons to determine causal differences in 
the success and failure of the various movements. If the model produces different results 
(i.e., the absence of a trait in a successful revolution or the presence of all characteristics 
in a failed campaign), then further analysis will seek to explain why the outcomes differed 
from the anticipated results. The working hypothesis is that Foran’s model of social 
revolutions in Third World countries will adequately account for success or failure in the 
developing countries of the Arab Spring.  
A. APPLYING FORAN’S MODEL TO THE ARAB SPRING 
Foran used well-documented cases with clear outcomes. The Arab Spring is less 
than a decade old, and classifying the outcome of several, or perhaps all, of the cases is less 
clear and subject to debate. As noted previously, this thesis operationalizes the outcomes 
of the Arab Spring revolts using a democratic polity rating (DPR), which I argue captures 
the effect of collective action on liberalization in the wake of the Arab Spring. Table 10 
applies Foran’s model to the Arab Spring Revolution of 2011. Similar to Foran’s approach 
(see Foran 1997, 2005), it is broken down by the various outcomes that characterized the 
Arab Spring: (1) successful social revolution, (2) attempted social revolution, (3) political 
revolution, and (4) no attempt at revolution. Unlike Foran, who used crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA), this thesis uses fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) because it allows the inclusion of non-
dichotomous variables. The table’s final column (Boolean Terms) indicates the presence 
or absence of the conditions (traits) favorable or unfavorable to revolution where a capital 
letter represents the presence of the corresponding trait, and lower case letters represent the 
absence of the trait. As the table indicates, the five traits identified by Foran were only 
present in Tunisia, which is the only state that experienced a successful social revolution. 
The rest of this section fills out the details of the table. 
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Table 10. Foran’s Five Factors of Revolution Applied to the Arab 
Spring Revolution of 201184 
Legend: For dichotomous coded traits, (1) represents the presence of a trait, (0) represents the absence 
of a trait, (1-) represents the initial presence of the political cultures then the breakdown of the trait to 
absence, and (1/0) represents the opening and subsequent closing of a world-systemic opening . 
*Capital letter represents the presence of the corresponding trait; lower case letters represent the 
absence of the trait. 
                                                 
84 Adapted from Foran, Taking Power. 247–249; Economic Downturn data adapted from Beck, 
“Reflections on the Revolutionary,” 218. 
  
 






















  Type One- Successful Social Revolution    
1. Tunisia   1 3.56 1 3.56% 1 1-SR ABCDE 
 Type Two- Attempted Social Revolution    
2. Bahrain  1 2.53 1- 4.63% 0 0-Oppression ABcDe 
3. Syria  1 2.50 1- 4.57% 1/0 0-Civil War ABcDe 
 Type Three- Political Revolution    
4. Egypt  1 3.22 1- 5.66% 0 0-PR/Coup ABcde 
5. Libya  1 1.34 1- 2.95% 1/0 0-PR/Civil War ABcDe 
6. Yemen  0 3.19 1- 5.07% 1/0 0-PR/Civil War aBcde 
 Type Four- No Attempt at Revolution    
7. Algeria  1 4.20 0 2.80% 0 0-Stability AbcDe 
8. Jordan  1 4.33 1 5.01% 0 0-Minor Reform Abcde 
9. Kuwait  1 4.69 0 1.08% 0 0-Stability AbcDe 
10. Lebanon  0 5.03 0 8.26% 0 0-Stability abcde 
11. Morocco  1 4.82 0 4.67% 0 0-Minor Reform AbcDe 
12.Oman  1 3.83 0 5.97% 0 0-Stability Abcde 
13. Qatar  1 2.30 0 15.43% 0 0-Stability ABcde 
14. Saudi Arabia  1 1.83 0 2.98% 0 0-Stability ABcDe 
15. UAE  1 2.56 0 1.04% 0 0-Stability ABcDe 
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As the table indicates, dependent development plagues the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) by creating social class stratification and significant income inequality 
gaps that overwhelmingly favor the elite class. Rentier state theory helps informs how 
inequality develops in oil-rich states in the MENA, a key component of dependent 
development. The six monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the 
UAE) of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), along with Algeria and Libya, receive a 
large portion their GDP from “rents” or income from external oil sales (see Figure 6). 
Rentier states create a societal dependency that strips the middle and labor classes of any 
power to oppose the state and makes them subservient in exchange for financial security. 
The traditional elite and merchant classes are replaced by government employees, 
technocrats, and military officers who are close to the center of economic activity that is 
dominated by the state.85 Furthermore, by definition, rentier states are dependent on larger 
economies to maintain their wealth, a principal factor in dependent development theory.  
 
Figure 6. Oil Rents in Percentage of GDP, 2008–200986 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria have developed into semi-rentier states, 
exhibiting similar state-society relationships as the oil-rich monarchies by other means. 
                                                 
85 Camilla Sandbakken, “The Limits to Democracy Posed by Oil Rentier States: The Cases of Algeria, 
Nigeria and Libya,” Democratization 13, no. 1 (February 2006): 139, https://doi.org/10.1080/
13510340500378464.  
86 Adapted from “Oil Rents (% of GDP) | Data,” The World Bank, 2011, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?end=2017&start=2017&view=bar. 
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Egypt’s state-controlled tourism sector, combined with rents from the Suez Canal and 
remittance from workers working abroad, fund the state. In turn, Egyptian elites have 
invested a substantial amount of money into tourism while leaving the traditional economy 
and industry underdeveloped.87 Like Egypt, the monarchies in Jordan and Morocco lack 
natural resources so instead rely on other means to secure rents. Tourism, remittances, and 
foreign aid enable the Jordanian government to provide a majority of jobs in the public 
sector, and subsidized food, fuel, and water that form the basis of the “social contract” 
between government and the people.88 The nationalization policies of the 1970s by the 
Moroccan monarchy put the government at the center of an economy highly dependent on 
agricultural and phosphate exports. After suffering numerous economic problems in the 
1980s, the Moroccan government has attempted to diversify and strengthen its financial 
standings over the last 30 years.89 Today, Morocco has expanded its textile and tourism 
industries in partnership with the EU, but the Moroccan economy is still plagued with 
inequalities. Despite being one of Africa’s top-performing economies, a 2018 report shows 
Morocco still suffers from broad social and income disparities, ranking the highest 
inequality index score among the North African countries.90 The Alawite minority-led 
Syrian regime has a tight grip over the country, controlling the vast public sector as a hedge 
against the majority Sunni-Arab population. The government uses rents from the oil 
industry along with foreign-aid to maintain a level of dependency amongst the upper 
middle class and elites.91   
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Tunisia does not fit the rentier state model, but it does have a segmented society 
with the state at the locus of economic activity. Tunisia’s socio-economic problems, 
dubbed “development of underdevelopment,” are characterized by micro-management by 
the state and dominated by a small, elite class that only benefits the metropolitan capital of 
Tunis.92  
Lebanon and Yemen fit the classification of underdevelopment, instead of 
dependent development. Years of civil war stifled social and economic development in 
both countries. Lebanon has failed to control widespread poverty, and economic growth 
has been non-inclusive across the country’s diverse culture. A World Bank report attributes 
the inequality to a combination of an elite-controlled government and economic shocks 
from years of war and other political clashes in the Middle East.93 Furthermore, a United 
Nations (UN) study showed that the post-war reconstruction in Lebanon during the 1990s 
failed to reach its objectives by 2007 because of bad fiscal policy and domestic politics that 
inhibited economic growth.94 Despite oil reserves, Yemen remains one of the poorest 
countries in the MENA, with over half the country living on $2 a day and unemployment 
rates at a staggering 40%.95  
The 2009 DPR score for each country was used to quantify the authoritarian trait. 
The fuzzy sets were calibrated using a score of 0 (completely authoritarian) as full 
membership for the trait, a score of 4 (authoritarian-leaning hybrid regime) as the crossover 
threshold, and a score of 5 (democratic-leaning hybrid regime) as full non-membership of 
the trait. Based on this calibration, the six cases of successful (Tunisia), political revolution 
(Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, or an attempted revolution (Syria and Bahrain) all possess the 
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authoritarian trait. Thus at the onset, we know that the trait is necessary for a revolutionary 
situation to develop, but the trait is also present in three of the “no attempts at revolution” 
(Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) so it is not sufficient for a revolutionary situation to 
develop. 
A dichotomous code was used for the political cultures of opposition. The level of 
collective action (mass, significant, or isolated) observed in each country was the most 
definite indicator if that the trait may exist. In cases where only isolated protests happened, 
it is apparent the trait is absent, but in the other instances where significant-to-mass 
collective action occurred, more analysis is required. In Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, mass 
collective action resulted in cross-social class coalitions that challenged the government, 
but only in Tunisia did the coalition last to see through a successful social revolution. In 
Bahrain, the largest protests per capita occurred, consisting of a broad, cross-sectarian 
coalition that challenged the government.96 The protesters remain largely non-violent, 
even in the face of a violent crackdown by the government and GCC soldiers. Still, by the 
end of 2011, most of the influential protest leaders and organizers were imprisoned.97 As 
smaller demonstrations continued over the next three years, the government continued to 
target (mainly the Shi’a population) individuals, until the situation in Bahrain eventually 
returned to normal by 2015.98 
While the revolution in Egypt appears to have had a unified coalition that 
successfully unseated the Hosni Mubarak, cleavages between power bases emerged that 
undid the revolution. The Egyptian military stood by as the President they had guaranteed 
power for over three decades was unseated by frustrated and unemployed youths. The 
military and bureaucracy remained in place to dictate the future of Egypt, which became 
problematic in Egypt’s chances of democratization.99 The Egyptian generals of the 
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Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCARF) that forced Mubarak out of office had an 
agenda that differed from the will of the people once it took control of Egypt. The SCARF 
planned to solidify its power by allowing political parties, including the MB, to vie for 
control of seats in a weakened parliament, giving the illusion of plurality.100 However, 
when the MB won a majority of parliamentary seats, and MB-backed Mohammed Morsi 
beat out the SCARF’s bid for president, the SCARF’s plan backfired which, eventually led 
to the 2013 coup by SCARF.101 Retired Egyptian military general Abdel Fattach al-Sisi 
took power from Morsi and essentially returned Egypt to a pre-Arab Spring authoritative 
state.  
In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, revolutionaries failed to coalesce into a broad 
coalition, instead of forming multiple factions vying for control. Yemen’s history of civil 
war remerged during the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Former separatists from 
Yemen’s south, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) jihadist to the east, Iranian-
back Houthi’s in the country’s north, and deep tribal affiliates with access to millions of 
small arms turned a revolutionary situation into a civil war.102 Muammar Gadhafi’s 
opposition in Libya centered around loosely affiliated “revolutionary brigades” made up 
of 30–70 fighters and informal military councils, loyal first to their tribal affiliation and 
local communities.103 In Syria, the Arab Spring protests gave way to hundreds of named 
opposition groups struggling for power with one another because of ideologic 
differences.104 A 2016 report described the 90,000-strong Syrian opposition (excluding 
the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force) as divided between four significant ideologies; 
transnational Salafi-jihadists (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/al-Qaeda(AQ)), 
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national Salafi-jihadists, political Islamists, and secularists.105 Not only does the 
composition of the ideologically aligned fighters vary by front, but external support from 
western countries, Turkey, Jordan, and the GCC promoted competition amongst the 
groups. The report points to external support combined with ideological differences are the 
principal reasons the Syrian opposition from was unable to coordinating effective, large-
scale operations against the Syrian regime.106  
To capture the breakdown in the political cultures of opposition in Bahrain, Syria, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, a code of (1-) was applied, which can be represented as present 
or not present when conducting Boolean minimization depending on the analysis.107 While 
significant protests erupted in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Morocco, they 
require more analysis to determine if political cultures of opposition existed, or if they 
protester lacked the revolutionary motives and coalition of social classes.  
In Algeria, the Arab Spring protests failed to gain significant traction for two main 
reasons. Memories of the 1990s civil war kept many Algerians at bay from supporting 
radical change in the country, resulting in only calls for incremental reforms by the 
protestors. More importantly, the Algerian government used the oil-wealth, in typical 
rentier fashion, to appease the protesters by increasing spending on subsidies, social 
housing, and state jobs and wages.108 Kuwait saw the largest demonstrations in its history 
during the Arab Spring. Still, despite the tribal coalition and youth participation, protestors 
lacked the revolutionary mindset and never called for regime change, just increased 
accountability of the state.109 The same was said for protests against the Moroccan 
monarchy. While a broad coalition of Islamists, upper-middle-class, young, and 
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unemployed students, and the impoverished protested in the 10,000s, Moroccans called for 
changes to the constitution, not the overthrow of the government.110 Finally, Jordan 
represents the single case where a political culture of opposition existed, yet no attempt at 
revolution materialized beyond a handful of significant protests. Apart from the 
unemployed youth, Arab Spring protesters in Jordan had key support from tribes, retired 
military officers, and liberal elites who had otherwise remained in lockstep with the 
monarchy in the past.111 While the protests first called only for constitutional amendments, 
when the MB and the Salafists mobilized, demonstrations started calling for the overthrow 
of King Abdullah II.112 At this point, a political culture of opposition necessary for a 
revolution emerged. Similar to Bahrain, the coalition lost its momentum from a 
combination of actions by the state, an influx of money from the GCC, and lack of 
commitment of the would-be revolutionaries to continue to challenge the state. Again, a 
code of (1-) was applied to the Jordan case to capture the breakdown in the political 
cultures of opposition. 
Economic downturn was measured using Beck’s 2014 study on the Arab Spring in 
which he used the average annual growth in real GDP between 2008 and 2010 according 
to the World Bank.113 Beck set full membership in the trait at 2%, cross over at 3%, and 
full non-membership at 4%. However, because the International Monetary Fund 
assessment that most MENA countries need to maintain growth over 6% real GDP to 
combat chronic unemployment problems and growing populations in the region,114 this 
study sets full membership at 4%, cross over at 5%, and full non-membership at 6%. Based 
on this calibrated fuzzy-set, nine cases possessed the trait leaving six cases without the 
economic downturn trait. Unlike the authoritarian trait, the initial analysis shows that an 
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economic downturn was not necessary for a revolutionary situation to develop since the 
trait was only present in four of the six cases where revolutionary situations developed and 
in only five of the nine “no attempts at revolution” cases.  
Finally, a world-systemic opening was measured if a major change in the 
relationship between the country in question and a primary ally or major power favored the 
revolutionaries. President Obama addressed the Muslim world in 2009 from Cairo 
University, promoting democratic principles to citizens of autocratic countries.115 
Obama’s speech signaled the new administration was ready to support the will of the 
people, not the will of the Arab autocrats, priming the MENA for change. Atlas explains 
that the U.S. was caught between two competing IR theories: idealism and realism. Realism 
shaped U.S. foreign policy in the MENA for decades by placing stability and national 
interests over promoting democratic values in the liberal world order (i.e., U.S. support to 
Arab autocrats). The U.S. also could not dismiss the protest demands for democracy 
without being at an extreme contradiction with core American democratic principles.116 
This contradiction in U.S. foreign policy may account for a muted reaction toward the 
Tunisian revolution by the U.S. that ultimately favored the protestors. The European Union 
(EU) also played a significant role in supporting the revolution in Tunisia. The EU provided 
monetary and interest group support that aided the democratic transition in Tunisia, giving 
the opportunity for democracy to take root during a vulnerable period for Tunisia.117 
The Libyan revolutionary situation escalated dramatically when the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1973 on March 13, 2011, which directed a no-
fly zone to be established in Libya to protect the lives of civilians from the Gadhafi 
regime,118 which enabled the loosely-organized Libyan revolutionary brigades under 
                                                 
115 For the full text of the speech, see Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 
6–04-09,” The White House: President Barack Obama, June 4, 2009, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09. 
116 Pierre M. Atlas, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,” 
Digest of Middle East Studies 21, no. 2 (November 2012): 353–355, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-
3606.2012.00158.x.  
117 Krüger and Ratka, “The Perception of European Policies,” 2–10. 
118 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “UNSC Resolution 1973” (March 17, 2011), 
https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/1973%20(2011). 
45 
cover of NATO air support to overthrow the Gadhafi regime in a matter of months.119 In 
Yemen, a world systemic opening came via political pressure instead of military 
intervention. Between February to October 2011, the United States and the GCC (with an 
endorsement from the UNSC) compelled President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down amidst 
mass protests that were turning increasingly violent.120  
Whether a world-systemic opening existed in the Syrian case is subject to debate. 
The support to revolutionaries was not as publicly evident as the military intervention in 
Libya, nor was the political message as clear toward the Assad regime as it was when the 
UNSC endorsed the plan for Yemen’s Saleh to step down. The U.S. quickly levied support 
for democratic transition in Syria by initiating sanctions against the Assad regime starting 
in 2011 after widespread protests emerged but failed to take a firm stance on Assad’s 
removal from power.121 By 2013, several Western countries, Turkey and GCC members, 
quietly supported the armed opposition against Assad with significant levels of material 
and monetary support.122 After nearly four years of violence and unrest in Syria, the UNSC 
adopted resolution 2245 (2015), which outlined a vague process for a political transition to 
end the conflict but left the future of Assad himself much in question.  
Foran used a code of (1/0) to capture a situation where world-systemic openings 
existed, but “were not deep enough to permit social revolutions.” 123 This description fits 
the Libya, Yemen, and Syrian cases where world-systemic openings were present, but the 
ensuing civil wars in each country demonstrate their lack of effectiveness. Here, the (1/0) 
code is interpreted as a (0) for the absence of the trait when conducting Boolean 
minimization. Still, it provides a means of distinguishing Libya, Yemen, and Syrian from 
cases where world-systemic openings did not exist at all.  
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Despite calls by world leaders to support the calls for democracy by Arab Spring 
protesters, it appears that world-systemic openings in the other 11 cases were not present. 
In the case of Egypt, although a world-systemic opening seemed likely, there is no 
discernible evidence that the U.S. or other regional players actively supported Egyptian 
democratization. In Jordan, where significant collective action occurred, the U.S. remain 
steadfast behind the king, while the GCC sent billions of dollars to help calm the situation. 
The revolution attempt in Bahrain could be a called a world-systemic closing when the 
GCC sent in military forces to quell the uprising while the U.S. faithfully stood by King 
Hamad without calling for his removal.124 And for the Arab Spring protesters that came 
out in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, mere 
lip-service paid by world leaders was not adequate to support democratization.  
B. OUTCOMES OF THE FSQCA ANALYSIS  
Tunisia follows the pattern of ABCDE, while the other 14 cases had the absence of 
one or more traits, supporting the initial hypothesis. The two examples of attempted 
revolutions follow different patterns that can be reduced down. Bahrain and Syria followed 
the same ABcDe if we treat (1-) as absent for the political cultures of opposition trait. If 
we treat (1-) as present, we are left with ABCDe. This is an important distinction because 
it follows the same pattern of attempted social revolutions in Foran’s analysis, where six 
out of eight cases for failed social revolutions take the path ABCDe when Foran counts (1-
) as present.125 When Foran treats (1-) as absent, two distinct patterns emerge AbcDe and 
Abcde, which reduces down to Abce. This leads to two tentative observations/conclusions 
concerning the Arab Spring. First, these results could differ from Foran’s in how the traits 
are defined. As noted earlier, Foran used a crisp set data for all his traits, while this study 
incorporates fuzzy-sets to capture the authoritarian trait and economic downturn (real GDP 
growth). Therefore, there may be some disparity between his and this study’s analyses. 
Second, the similarities in patterns suggest dependent development is both a necessary 
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condition for successful and unsuccessful attempts at social revolution and the importance 
of the political cultures of opposition and world-systemic openings are to a revolution. This 
absence of the latter two traits appears to be the most significant barrier to a successful 
social revolution. In both cases, a revolutionary opposition existed but fractured amidst 
growing pressure from the state, while a world-systemic opening existed in Syria but closed 
due to substantial support by the Iranian and Russia governments. It becomes a reasonable 
assertion that if the United States took an active role in supporting democratization in 
Bahrain before the GCC intervened, then the five necessary and sufficient traits for a 
successful revolution would have existed, increasing the chance for successful social 
revolution in Bahrain.  
The pathway of political revolutions during the Arab Spring reveals equally as 
interesting results as the successful case of Tunisia. The outcomes of Egypt, Libya, and 
Yemen reduce down to Bce, mirroring the reduction of Foran’s five cases of political 
revolution that also reduced to Bce.126 Foran concludes that “Political culture and world-
systemic opening thus act as powerful deflectors of revolutionary movements and brakes 
on social transformation,” supporting the previous idea of how important these traits are 
for the success of a social revolution. 
The nine cases of non-attempts at social revolution are excellent examples to 
compare against the nine similar cases of Foran’s, where only two of the nine (Iraq 1991–
2003, Argentina 1983-present) possess three traits following the pattern ABcDe, while the 
other seven possess two or less.127 The Arab Spring cases follow the same pattern, with 
only two instances (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) following the pattern ABcDe, with the rest 
possessing two or fewer traits. These two cases reinforce the necessary presence of the trait 
political cultures of opposition for the higher probability for a revolution to occur. If we 
compare Saudi Arabia and the UAE cases to the three other cases were the ABcDe pattern 
occurred (Bahrain, Syria, and Libya), we find the difference between an attempt at or a 
successful political revolution and the no attempt at revolution. The difference lies in the 
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initial presence of the political culture trait that fractured (denoted by the 1-) and resulted 
in either an unsuccessful attempt at social revolution or a political revolution that falls short 
of meeting the requirements of a social revolution. 
C. CONCLUSION 
To summarize, this chapter supports Hypothesis 1, demonstrating that Foran’s 
model of social revolutions in Third World countries adequately accounts for success or 
failure in the 15 cases tested from the Arab Spring. Using Boolean minimization 
techniques, the different outcomes were parsed into sets of necessary and sufficient traits. 
Tunisia, the only successful social revolution, possessed all five causal factors, which 
directly associates with Foran’s finding in his analysis of social revolutions. The other 14 
cases lacked one or more causal factors from Foran’s model. The Boolean minimization 
revealed three important findings about the causal factors and the Arab Spring. First, the 
analysis reinforced Foran’s emphasis on the political cultures of opposition and world-
systemic opening traits, demonstrating how these traits are the most significant barriers to 
a successful social revolution. Second, dependent development and authoritarian 
governments played a significant role in framing the underlying grievances of 
revolutionaries during the Arab Spring, but the underdevelopment of a country is also 
worth considering. Finally, the analysis departs from Foran’s levied importance on 
economic factors, with an economic downturn still being a necessary trait for social 
revolution, but played an unsubstantiated role delineating between cases where a revolution 
was attempted or did not. The findings of this chapter validated the application of Foran’s 
model to analyze the Arab Spring. The next chapter uses Foran’s model to guide the case 





IV. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter explores three case studies using Foran’s model of Third World 
revolutions applied to Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. The previous chapter demonstrated the 
validity of the model. It also placed specific emphasis on the political cultures of opposition 
and the world-systemic opening as the most important traits for the success of a social 
revolution. The purpose of this chapter is to derive salient points to test Hypothesis 2 in a case 
study comparison in the final chapter of this thesis. 
A. TUNISIA: A SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL REVOLUTION  
Mass mobilization, the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and the 
anticipated social and economic reforms promised by the new democratic government qualify 
the 2011 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia as a social revolution. Based on the previous 
Chapter’s findings, Tunisia is also the only MENA country whose DPR indicates that it 
changed from an authoritative regime to a democratic government during the Arab Spring. 
The fsQCA approach and Boolean minimization demonstrated Tunisia followed an ABCDE 
pathway to the social revolution supporting Hypothesis 1. 
1. Dependent Development 
Street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight to protest the injustices of a 
government that stifled private-sector growth and promoted dependent development. 
Bouazizi, like many other Tunisians, was frustrated with the current socio-economic 
problems, dubbed “development of underdevelopment”: an economy micro-managed by the 
state, dominated by a small, elite class, that only benefited the metropolitan capital of 
Tunis.128 The central Tunisian government exerted extreme control over local government 
entities, reducing their speed and effectiveness to provide the daily social and government 
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services to its citizens.129Despite modest economic gains between 2000–2010, Tunisia lacked 
inclusive growth demonstrated by the increase in poor in the rural North West and Center-
West regions (see Table 11). Gallup polls conducted in 2009 and 2010 revealed that tight 
control by the Ben Ali regime was creating fissures throughout the working class. Just as 
Bouazizi killed himself to protest local authorities seizing his goods, the Gallup polls (see 
Figure 7) indicated that a growing percentage of business owners were becoming frustrated 
with the government.130 Tunisians were locked into a social contract with the Ben Ali regime 
that saw individual rights and political freedom traded for economic and social security from 
the state.131 In reality, the Ben Ali regime concentrated wealth among the elite class, creating 
social inequality along with an economy that was highly susceptible to external shocks.132 
 
Table 11. Tunisia Poverty and Extreme Poverty Rates Show Wide 
and Persisting Regional Disparities 133 
  
 





  2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Tunisia  32.4 23.3 15.5 12 7.6 4.6 100 100 100 100 
Greater 
Tunis  21 14.6 9.1 4.3 2.3 1.1 14.1 13.6 7.8 5.5 
North 
East  32.1 21.6 10.3 10.5 5.4 1.8 13.5 9.2 12 5.4 
North 
West  35.3 26.9 25.7 12.1 8.9 8.8 14.2 19.1 13.2 22 
Center 
East  21.4 12.6 8 6.4 2.6 1.6 14.4 12 11.6 8.1 
Center 
West  49.3 46.5 32.3 25.5 23.2 14.3 22 27.7 30.7 41.3 
South 
East  44.3 29 17.9 17.5 9.6 4.9 12.9 10.5 13.7 9.7 
South 
West  47.8 33.2 21.5 21.7 12.1 6.4 8.7 7.9 10.7 7.9 
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Figure 7. Tunisian Perspective Sour on Business Environment 134  
2. Authoritarian  
The Ben Ali regime typified the “repressive, exclusionary, personalist state” 
characteristic in Foran’s model. It was a quasi-mafia, police state where the 2 million strong 
(18% of the population) Rally for Constitutional Democracy (RCD) party supported the 
Ministry of Interior and the 120,000-150,000 police officers that ensured an airtight 
rule.135 Ben Ali used political parties to create the illusion of democracy, but in reality, 
these parties were nothing more than puppets of the government.136 Also, the DPR for 
Tunisia averaged 3.50 between 1975–2009, supporting its classification as authoritarian. 
The five families of Tunisia (Ben Ali, Trabelsi, Chiboub, Matri, and Mabrouk) dominated 
the banking, commerce, transportation, food, petroleum, cement, construction, and 
agricultural sectors guaranteeing prosperity only for the chosen elite.137  
                                                 
134 Adapted from “Tunisia: Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring,” Gallup, accessed July 30, 2019, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx. 
135 Amira Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution: The Revolution of Dignity,” The Journal of the 
Middle East and Africa 3, no. 1 (January 2012): 18–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2012.675545. 22. 
136 Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution,” 23. 
137 Aleya-Sghaier, “The Tunisian Revolution,” 22–23. 
52 
The Ben Ali regime skillful employed neoliberal economic policies supported by 
the international community as a tool of state-sponsored corruption. During the 1980s 
through the mid-1990s, the Tunisian government privatized 45 companies in a process best 
described as “ad hoc, opaque and not well understood.” 138 Interestingly enough, it was 
not until after the fall of the Ben Ali regime did the world fully understand the extent Ben 
Ali used corruption for personal gain and what was actually happening during the 
“privatization” process. By 2010, Ben Ali owned 220 firms, just 1% of the job market, but 
received 21% of the country’s private sector profits.139 Hannes Baumann detailed how 
Ben Ali fooled the world before 2011: Europe highly favored the regime, the World Bank 
hailed the success of the Tunisian economy, and Transparency International (TI) failed to 
detect the government’s extensive cronyism and corruption.140 While Baumann points to 
issues with the TI research methodology as the principal reason why it perceived Tunisia 
to be less corrupt than it was, the underestimation of corruption also says something about 
the regime.141 Ben Ali’s ability to extort wealth from his own country in a mafia-like 
fashion, while managing the facade as a fully functioning member of the liberal world order 
is fascinating. The extent of not only the corruption but also the control of Ben Ali and his 
cronies to pull off such an endeavor points to the high degree of systematic oppression and 
micro-management by the state.  
3. Political Cultures of Opposition 
Foran argued the political cultures of opposition require a cross-class coalition that 
is ideologically strong enough to withstand dissenting opinions on the direction of the 
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revolution.142 Without this political culture of opposition, it is hard to envision how a 
social movement could exist. Minor uprisings underscored the marginalization and 
frustration of underprivileged Tunisians. After 50 years and two dictatorships, these 
tensions boiled over into a full-fledged revolution.  
The only labor union in Tunisia, the Tunisian General Labor Union, known by the 
French acronym UGTT, played a pivotal role in the revolution by providing professional 
organization to the spontaneous protests that erupted in the wake of Bouazizi’s self-
immolation in the impoverished city of Sidi Bouzid.143 The UGTT first ushered in dissent 
against the regime when it sponsored several labor strikes against the Bourguiba regime 
(1957-1987) in 1978; however, this act of civil disobedience was met with violence by the 
government, leaving hundreds of UGTT members dead or injured.144 Under the Ben Ali 
regime (1987-2011), the UGTT, along with political parties and other social organizations, 
fell in line with the government, presumably through corruption and bribes.145  In 2008, 
an internal dispute emerged between the local chapter of the UGTT in Redeyef and the 
regional leader in Gafsa, Amara Abbasi, a corrupt RCD-party parliament member. The 
poverty levels and unemployment rates in the mining district fueled the protests. Protesters, 
with support from the local UGTT chapter, shut down the Gafsa Phosphate Company in 
response to allegations that Abbasi was using his position to hand out jobs based on his 
personal connections.. Although this first act of major civil disobedience since 1978 did 
not bring about any changes, it primed the environment for revolution in 2010.146 
While dependent development created a disparity between classes, poverty only 
partially explains the frustrations and grievances of the revolutionaries. A young, educated, 
and unemployed population helped give the revolution life. In 2010, about 44% of the 
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population was under the age of 25, and unemployment rates of Tunisian’s with higher 
education swelled from 121,800 in 1996 to 336,000 in 2008.147 As one study showed, as 
the protest spread from the more impoverished regions of Tunisia to the capital, Tunis, 
most of the protesters killed by the government were between 19–29 years old and from 
the most impoverished neighborhoods in Tunis.148  
Coalescing a social movement into a successful revolution requires some level of 
organization, structure, and unity. As demonstrations spread through Tunisia, the original 
protest chants were moderate, calling for “work, freedom, and national dignity,” made 
popular by the Union for Unemployed Graduates. Later, after the UGTT and other groups 
join the cause, the protesters called for the overthrow of Ben Ali.149 Social media helped 
change the message from moderate reform to a revolutionary cause. Tunisians 
circumnavigated the regimes tight control of mass media by sharing images and videos of 
brutality against protestors on Facebook.150 More so, in the years leading up to the 
revolution, online users in Tunisia connected to the outside world, circulated tactics and 
techniques to organize collective action against the regime.151  
Islamist groups, both militant and political, have a long history of challenging state 
power in the MENA. Interestingly enough, the political Islamists of the al-Nahda party 
were absent from the protests against Ben Ali and only joined the coalition after his 
removal.152 Mechan offers a compelling reason for this: Arab dictators have long used 
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Islamist groups as the scapegoat for political unrest. Therefore, they were unwilling to 
accept a leading role in until the outcome seemed favorable.153 
After Ben Ali fled the country, a broad coalition of 28 civic and social groups, 
including the UGTT, the Tunisian Judges Association, the Tunisian Journalist Syndicate, 
the National Lawyers Association, and the al-Nahda party, formed the National Council to 
Protect the Revolution with the goal of enacting democratic reforms and removing old 
power structures.154 The Tunisian revolutionaries encompassed the young, the 
unemployed, the educated, and the professional working-class, who all shared a similar 
vision of a democratic government that would foster equality and dignity. The use of social 
media furthered their resolve by connecting disseminating revolutionary ideas. With a third 
of the population regularly using the internet in 2010, social media websites opened the 
discourse of an otherwise politically-oppressed society on state corruption, abuse of power, 
and violence against protestors by the Ben Ali regime.155 Although capturing the trait of 
political cultures of opposition may be the most challenging, the previous examples suggest 
they may be the primary reason why the Jasmine Revolution succeeded. 
4. Economic Downturn 
The last two traits of a successful revolution in Foran’s model concern external 
factors that bring about a revolutionary crisis. The first is an economic downturn. The 2008 
financial crisis had wide-ranging impacts across the world, but Tunisia’s stock market and 
banks were not well connected to international markets, which softened the blow of the 
recession.156 While the GDP per capita steadily increased in the late 2000s despite the 
2008 recession, a Gallup poll which identified Tunisians who were either thriving, 
struggling, or suffering, showed a decrease in those who were thriving from 24% in 2008 
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to 14% in 2010 (14%).157 Mouley asserts that the effects of the economic downturn 
transferred from hard-hit Western economies to the European-focused export industry of 
Tunisia (exports fell from 7% in 2007 to 1% in 2008, to -22% in the first quarter of 
2009),158 which suggests that although the Tunisian government and elites weathered the 
recession relatively well, others did not. The thriving middle class, the educated and still 
unemployed, and the disenfranchised poor were the ones who felt the real impact of the 
economic downturn. 
5. World-Systemic Opening 
Finally, according to Foran’s model, a revolution requires a world-systemic 
opening. Stepping away from the structuralist-cultural approach, international relations 
(IR) theory provides a better lens to examine this dynamic. Foreign relations between 
Tunisia and the U.S. and the European Union (EU) are critical to understanding why the 
revolution was successful from an external factor perspective. The U.S. maintained 
strategic relationships with autocrats in the MENA for decades, prioritizing stability and 
normalized relationships over progress toward liberalization.159 Lack of condemnation of 
the protests or substantial support for the Ben Ali regime by the U.S. effectively put the 
future of the revolution in the hands of the protestors. Atlas explains that the U.S. was 
caught between two competing IR theories: idealism, and realism. Realism shaped U.S. 
foreign policy in the MENA for decades by placing stability and national interests over 
promoting democratic values in the liberal world order (i.e., U.S. support to Arab 
autocrats). But, the U.S. could not dismiss the protest demands for democracy without 
being at an extreme contradiction with core American democratic principles,160 and this 
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may account for a muted reaction toward the Tunisian revolution by the U.S. that ultimately 
favored the protestors.  
Pierre Atlas also points out that President Obama started this reckoning between 
realism and idealism when he addressed the Muslim world in 2009 from Cairo University. 
Obama placed the realist approach of protecting the American people as his top priority 
but stressed idealist principles á la Woodrow Wilson or Ronald Reagan, promoting 
democratic principles to citizens of autocratic countries.161 Obama’s speech signaled that 
the new administration was ready to support the will of the people, not the will of the Arab 
autocrats, priming the MENA for change.  
Equally important for a world-systemic opening for revolution in Tunisia was the 
EU’s involvement in the democratic transition process. As the MENA has a long history 
of rapid transfer of power from one autocrat to another, the moment Ben Ali stepped down 
from power was a pivotal point for Tunisia to either follow the will of the people toward 
democracy or for an elite to wrest control and form a new autocracy. Before the fall of the 
Ben Ali regime, European-Tunisian relations were described as economic-centered and to 
a lesser extent, security-related.162 Although from a political standpoint, many publicly 
criticized the EU for inaction in the wake of the Arab Spring, an academic perspective 
shows the EU provided monetary and interest group support that aided the democratic 
transition in Tunisia.163 The change in European-Tunisia relationships provided an 
opportunity for democracy to take root during a vulnerable period for Tunisia.  
B. EGYPT: POLITICAL REVOLUTION 
In early 2011, the call to overthrow the Western-backed autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, 
was met with feverous support across the country. A powerful regime crumbled as its 
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military stood idle. A revolution that was decades in the making had finally succeeded. 
More changes in power would take place in the coming years, but the political revolution 
in Egypt succeed in principle through regime change. Egypt held democratic elections that 
ushered in Mohammed Morsi and the MB into power, but social and economic change 
associated with social revolutions did not occur. A military coup again overthrew the 
government in 2013, and General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was later put in power, returning 
Egypt to the same power structure before the 2011 revolution. This reversal is reflected in 
the DPR trendline as Egypt moves toward democracy after the first overthrow, reaches a 
level of new liberalization, and then returns to the pre-revolution authoritative polity. The 
analysis in the previous chapter showed that Egypt followed an ABcde pathway to the 
political revolution. This section seeks to explain how the combination of presence and 
absence of traits conducive for a social revolution, permitted a political revolution but 
stifled farther-reaching social and economic change.  
1. Dependent Development 
Starting in the 1970s, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat transformed the socialist 
structure of Egypt into a liberalized economy that untimely paved the way for dependent 
development. Sadat’s economic stimulus policies began in 1974 and created a country 
dependent on foreign aid (primarily from the U.S.), foreign investment, and external 
technical assistance.164 In particular, substantial U.S. support of the Egyptian economy 
discouraged Egyptian leadership from pursuing policies that would maximize its domestic 
potential and development.165 After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the Mubarak regime 
experienced increasing GDP growth but failed to implement any significant economic 
reforms despite the oil-price collapse of 1985 and ballooning foreign debt.166 World 
market volatilities also affected the Egyptian economy because a large portion of the 
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Egyptian GDP was derived from the Suez Canal, tourism, and remittance from workers 
working in the MENA oil-exporters.167 Despite substantial growth, significant foreign 
debt combined with market uncertainties forced the country into neoliberal economic 
reform in the 1990s. Egypt launched a successful stabilization effort that reduced the fiscal 
deficit from 15% to 1.3% and increased the privatization of business by 33% from 1992–
1998, positioning Egypt for continued economic growth into the 2000s.168  
While the Egyptian economy might be viewed as a success story for the transition 
from socialism to capitalism, the 2011 revolution suggests there were many unresolved 
issues. Social and economic inequality is a key component of dependent development. 
Kandeel suggests the Egyptian elite only enjoyed the economic growth, and balanced 
socio-economic development was never achieved. Kandeel describes a suffering middle 
class, squeezed between the poor who make up one-fifth the population, and the regime 
elites and nouveau-riches who make up the other end of the spectrum. While evidence of 
distorted social classes was evident in the systemic underdevelopment of Tunisia, the 
situation seems to be less apparent in Egypt. A World Bank report dubs the Arab Spring 
revolutions an “Arab inequality puzzle,” proposing the notion that other factors such as 
quality of life, freedoms, or corruption played a more significant role over economic 
inequality.169 The report concludes (with Egypt as the primary case study):  
The middle classes were particularly frustrated as their standards of living 
were deteriorating, reflecting a shortage of formal sector jobs, 
dissatisfaction with the quality of public services, and government 
accountability. Ordinary people were unhappy that they could not share in 
the prosperity generated by the relatively few, large Arab firms and 
struggled to get ahead by working hard.170 
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Similar to the Tunisian case, labor strikes started to erupt in Egypt that signaled 
growing discontent. From 2006 to 2008, waves of labor strikes, some organized through 
social media, saw thousands of Egyptians protesting perceived social injustices and dire 
economic situations.171 While hard to quantify, the available evidence suggests that Egypt 
suffered from decades of dependent development that hurt social equality.  
2. Authoritarian  
The evolution of the Egyptian government into an authoritarian state started in the 
1950s fueled by nationalism, and later by the existential threat posed by radical extremists. 
The evolution into authoritarian also tells the story of the political cultures of opposition 
that primed the country for revolution. The Pan-Arab movement would become 
synonymous with autocracy as military coups would install strongmen into power in Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq.172 Gamal Abdel Nasser took control of Egypt through a military coup in 
1952 and rose to power as the de facto leader of the Arab world by the early 1960s.173 As 
Nasser built his political framework around Pan-Arabism, Western support of Israel during 
the 1956 Sinai Campaign against Egypt rallied the support of the Arab world behind 
Nasser.174 Nasser turned to the Soviet Union for support to spite the West, leading to 
fellow Arab-nationalist states Iraq and Syria to follow suit.175 While he galvanized the 
Arab world under the Pan-Arab movement, he would never recover from the 
embarrassment suffered during the 1967 war with Israel. His successor, Anwar Sadat, 
separated Egypt from the Pan-Arab movement and socialism, but it was not the end of 
Arab-nationalism.176 
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Counter to the political narrative of Pan-Arabism, political Islam has grown into a 
powerful dynamic of state identity in the MENA. Islamists have found a strong support 
base in the greater Middle East by offering a religious alternative to the corrupt autocracies 
that dominated Middle Eastern politics since the middle 20th century.177  Three general 
characteristics can describe the Islamist narrative: a political movement called an “Islamic 
movement,” the call for an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, and an organized effort 
constructed to meet the political ends.178  
In terms of the first, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded in Egypt in 1928, 
offered a political alternative to the perceived Western influences that threatened traditional 
Muslim values.179  The Nasser regime tried to crush the MB in the 1950s as members 
radicalized under Sayyid Qutb’s influence, but the MB was emboldened after Egypt’s 
crushing defeat by Israel during the 1967 war.180 Although a “non-violent organization,” 
the MB has had numerous connections to terrorist activities in Egypt, Syria, and in the 
Palestinian territories. Qutb’s early jihadist teachings advocated the overthrow of “un-
Islamic” governments across the Middle East before his arrest and execution in 1966.181 
His teachings lived on and became a staple of jihadist education.182 Islamists inspired by 
the MB and Qutb carried out the assassination of Sadat in 1981, leading to a harsh 
government crackdown by the newly installed Mubarak regime.183   
The Mubarak regime (1981-2011) was classified as a Presidential Republic, hosting 
a number of elections that kept Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
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in power.184 In reality, the DPR rating never exceeding 3.70 under Mubarak, placing Egypt 
amongst authoritarian states. This is because Mubarak also served as the chairman of the 
NDP, which as a political party, also became synonymous with nearly every government 
institution, securing Mubarak’s long-term survivability as president.185  By 2008, the 
median age of Egypt was 25, meaning that a majority of the Egyptians only knew one 
leader of their country.186 
State repression and violence also helped ensure Mubarak’s absolute rule. After 
Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak placed Egypt into a perpetual state of emergency, which 
allowed him to suspend the constitution, heavily censor mass-media, and enable the NDP-
controlled Ministry of Interior crackdown on dissidents with a heavy hand.187 The state of 
emergency, much like the democratic institutions, was a façade designed to keep the 
Egyptian strongman in power.  
3. Political Cultures of Opposition  
The oppression in Egypt created political cultures of opposition that coalesced into 
a revolutionary movement against the state. Opposing political parties were almost non-
existent under the Mubarak regime; the secretary-general of the NDP headed the regulatory 
body that approved new political parties.188 Under a system like this, it is hard to imagine 
how the MB lasted as an organization. It did by remaining relatively quiet during the 
beginning of the revolution,189 suggesting that avoiding confrontation with the Mubarak 
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regime was a conscious survival strategy on its part. However, if the MB was not critical 
in the early days of the revolution, who was? 
 Experts and media alike point to the internet-connected youth who conspired 
against the regime. A Reuter’s article tells how Facebook groups, “flash mobs,” and online 
activists formed the core of the revolutionaries; Time coined the Arab Spring in Egypt, 
“the Facebook Revolution;”190 and a RAND report argued for the importance of social 
media because it enabled the young, secular, and internet-connected youth to organize and 
sustain mass collective action against the state, despite the Mubarak regime’s attempt to 
crush the dissent.191  
Protests fueled by longstanding sectarianism tensions brought life to the Arab 
Spring in Egypt. Coptic Christians make up only about 7% of Egypt’s 82 million people 
but represent the largest minority group in the predominantly Sunni-Muslim population.192 
The Al-Qiddisayn (Two Saints) Coptic Church in Alexandria was bombed, killing 21 
Christians on January 1st, 2011, followed by the arrest, torture, and subsequent death on 
Muslim Sayid Bilal exacerbated tensions in Christian and Muslim communities alike.193 
The death of Bilal was painfully reminiscent for the people of Alexandria to an event that 
happened six months prior. In June 2010, security forces arrested and beat to death Khaled 
Siads, which promoted online activists to create Facebook pages with the ghastly imagine 
of disfigured face as a symbol of the Mubarak regime’s cruelty.194 The pages “My Name 
is Kaled Mohamed Siad” and Google regional executive Wael Ghonim’s own “Kullena 
Khalid Said” (We are all Khalid Said) quickly captured the attention of tens of thousands 
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of Egyptians.195 The anti-Mubarak online presence gained significant momentum leading 
up to Mubarak’s resignation. An analysis of tweets using the hashtag “#Egypt” revealed 
just ten tweets per day at the beginning of January 2011, increasing to over 100,000 tweets 
per day by the middle of February 2011 and culminating when Mubarak stepped down.196 
The revolution needed organization and leadership to transform the frustrations of 
online youth into real protests on the streets. Similar to Tunisia, labor protests preceded the 
Arab Spring in Egypt. The April 6th, 2008 labor strike saw a loose coalition of social media 
connected youths promoted by political opposition groups, such as the Egyptian Movement 
for Change (known as Kefaya, Arabic for “enough”) and professional associates that caught 
the state off guard.197 Kefaya was a political organization that formed in late 2004 to 
promote secular, democratic reforms in Egypt in response to Mubarak “wining” is six-term 
as president, and rumors Mubarak planned to transition power to his son Gamal 
Mubarak.198 The labor strikes also gave rise to the prominence of another political 
opposition leader, Mohamed Mostafa ElBaradei. ElBaradei was a highly regarded career 
statesman in Egypt, Nobel Prize winner, and through heavy promotion online, he became 
an activist for democratic change in 2010.199  
The military was a key component of the Egyptian revolution as it stood by as the 
President they had guaranteed power for over three decades faced mass demonstrations. 
On January 25th, 2011 Tahir Square became the symbol of the revolution, unifying the 
first mobilization efforts by secular groups like Kefaya with the Islamists from the MB 
who join the protests days later.200  While deadly clashes erupted between the protesters 
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and pro-Mubarak supporters and security forces, the military made it clear it would support 
the will of the people to peacefully demonstrate.201 The revolution in Egypt appears to 
have a unified coalition that successfully unseated the Hosni Mubarak, but cleavages 
between the power bases began to emerge that undid the revolution.  
After Mubarak stepped down, an interim government attempted to meet the 
revolutionary demands of establishing a new constitution. Still, divisions between the new 
Islamist voices and the old secular military powers resulted in a defunct document.202 The 
military and bureaucracy remained in place to dictate the future of Egypt, which became 
problematic in Egypt’s chances of democratization.203 And the Egyptian generals of the 
SCARF that forced Mubarak out of office had an agenda apart from the will of the people 
from when they took control of the Egypt in transition. The SCARF planned to solidify its 
power by allowing political parties, including the MB, to vie for control of seats in a 
weakened parliament, giving the illusion of plurality.204 When the MB won a majority of 
seats in parliament and MB-back Mohammed Morsi beat out the SCARF’s bid for 
president, the SCARF’s plan backfired which lead to the 2013 coup by SCARF.205 Retired 
Egyptian military general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi took power from Morsi and essentially 
returned Egypt to a pre-Arab Spring authoritative state.  
4. Economic Downturn 
The 2008 recession that rocked economies around the world was a different story 
in Egypt. The country maintained an average GDP growth of around 5.66% between 2008 
and 2010, with a slight decrease in 2009.206 The International Monetary Fund assessment 
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that most MENA countries need to maintain growth of 6% real GDP to combat chronic 
unemployment problems and growing populations in the region reinforces that economic 
downturn played an insignificant role as a causal factor in the revolution. Egypt 
experienced modest GDP-growth from the 1990s through 2000s and weathered the 2008 
recession well so economic stress was likely not a catalysis between the breakdown 
between the regime, the de facto powerbase in the military, and the Egyptian people.  
The counter to the argument that economic stress was not a causal factor in the 
Egyptian revolution lies in a look at who was most affected by the recession. Rising youth 
unemployment rates (27.4% in 2000 to 34% in 2007), increasing levels of consumer 
inflation (11.7% in 2008 to 16.1 in 2009), and changes to government-provided 
subsidiaries on basic household goods and oil plagued the Egyptian economy.207   
Furthermore, the report explains a troubling development in the labor market where 
skilled workers are in high demand, but in short supply while there is an excess of semi-
skilled technical school and university graduates who require substantial training to meet 
the labor market demands.208 Campante and Chor’s analysis of the Arab Spring suggests 
that the over-educated and underemployed population reached a point where the 
opportunity costs of joining a political protest against an authoritarian regime were 
outweighed by the prospects of a better life.209  
A segment of the population was affected by economic downturn, but does this 
qualify as a casual factor of the revolution? This argument supports one reason why 
Egyptians only accomplished a political revolution but not a social revolution. As 
mentioned before, social revolutions encompass not only regime change, but social and 
economic changes as well. Real GDP-growth was used to determine the presence or 
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absence of the trait economic downturn. Egypt experienced growth, which did slow after 
the 2008 recession, but not to the threshold of economic strain to that signals an economic 
downturn for the purposes of this thesis. It is worthy to note the connection between the 
young, unemployed Egyptians and their propensity to protest. 
5. World-Systemic Opening 
Similar to the Tunisia case, U.S. foreign policy had a muted response to the Arab 
Spring protests in Egypt. Instead of faithfully standing behind her ally, the U.S. took no 
action to prop up Mubarak and left the autocrat’s future in the hands of the people (and the 
military). The U.S. supported the democratic elections in 2012 with Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton meeting with Morsi to congratulate him on his win in the elections. After 
decades of marginalization, political Islamists finally gained a seat at the table. The show 
of support from the Obama administration was not enough to deter the SCAR from 
overthrowing Morsi after realizing the powerbase of the military elite was threatened, 
however. While the Obama administration temporarily suspended the substantial economic 
and military aid after the 2013 coup, it had little effect. By 2015, military and economic 
aid was turned back on with caveats, and Egypt also began procuring military hardware 
from France, Germany, and Russia.210 Nearly four years after the Arab Spring swept 
through the Middle East, the U.S. was still grappling with the clash of realism goal of 
protecting U.S. interest abroad and the idealistic notion of spreading democracy.  
The world systemic opening that ushered in democracy in Tunisia was only a dream 
for the people of Egypt. Much of this has to do with the lack of support for democratic 
transition from the EU. Instead of embracing economic incentives and support from the 
EU, Egypt turned to Saudi Arabia and the GCC to improve economic relations.211  The 
GCC provided over $60 billion in economic aid after the 2013 coup in a clear effort to 
                                                 
210 Robert Springborg and F.C Williams, “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes,” 
Carnegie Middle East Center, February 28, 2019, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/02/28/egyptian-military-
slumbering-giant-awakes-pub-78238. 
211 Laura Wurm, “Democratisation after the Arab Spring: How can the EU effectively support Tunisia 
and Egypt?” (Vienna: ÖGfE, 2018), 5, https://oegfe.at/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
OEGfE_Policy_Brief-2018.19_Laura-Wurm.pdf.  
68 
ensure the MB does not return to power, nor does the idea of democratization return to 
Egypt.212 In comparison, the EU only provided about $1 billion to Egypt between 2007–
2013, and suspended all democratization-linked support after coup, which was had minimal 
impact given the substantial support from the GCC.213  
In summary, the world-systemic opening conducive for social revolution was not 
present in the Egyptian case. Words were not met with action to support democratization 
in Egypt. The U.S. was caught in an uncomfortable position where democratic elections in 
Egypt brought in an undesirable partner. The rise of ISIS-affiliated extremist in the Sinai 
Peninsula and broader instability in the post-2011 Arab world has forced the U.S. and EU 
to accept stability under Sisi over long-overdue democratic reforms for the people of Egypt.  
C. SYRIA: A FAILED REVOLUTION ATTEMPT 
While the Syrian regime massacred thousands of Sunni Arabs in Hama in 1982 
with impunity, the information age made it impossible for the regime to cover up its harsh 
crackdown on the Arab Spring protesters decades later. The internet and news agencies 
broadcasted graphic images of protesters being gun downed by Syrian security forces. In 
2012, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) represented an amalgamation of Syrian opposition 
groups with a significant social media presence, while jihadist groups also took to social 
media to call supporters to Syria. Despite their efforts, the Syrian opposition could not 
overthrow the regime before Russian conducted a military intervention in late 2015, which 
helped turn the tide of the civil war. As of 2019, the Syrian revolution is all but dead. 
The Syrian case is classified as a failed revolution following a path of ABcDe from 
the previous chapter’s fsQCA approach and Boolean minimization. This section will 
explain how the presence of the casual factors played an important role in the revolutionary 
system, but the breakdown in the political cultures of opposition and the world-systemic 
opening doomed the revolution to failure. 
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1. Dependent Development 
From an economic development standpoint, Syria has trailed behind the oil-rich 
monarchies but has had enough development to be exploited as a source of power and 
control. As mentioned before, Syria is not a resource-rich country but maintains rentier 
state-like qualities. The Alawite minority-led Syrian regime held a tight grip over the 
country, controlling the vast public sector as a hedge against the majority Sunni-Arab 
population. The government used rents from the oil-industry (domestic oil production and 
remittances) along with foreign-aid to maintain a level of dependency amongst the upper 
middle class and elites.214 Despite economic neo-liberalization policies by Bashar al-
Assad in the early 2000s, most economic benefits only benefited the upper class in Syria 
and foreign investors from the GCC and Turkey.215 One report shows that between 1964 
and 2004, growth rates in the country benefited the country’s minority rich substantially 
more than the large population of poor Syrians.216 Furthermore, between 1997 and 2007, 
inequality based on the Gini index increased from 32.6% to 37.5%, a remarkably sharp 
increase in a short period.217   
Foran argued that dependent development is one of the most important causal 
factors of social revolution because it is the principle source of grievances and causes social 
stratification.218 In Syria, it appears the government managed the country from the 1980s 
into the 21st century in a way to passive a majority of the people. It should be no 
coincidence that Bashar al-Assad’s neo-liberalization policies coincided with a sharp 
increase in inequality in the years leading up to the Arab Spring. Scholars have argued 
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since the start of the Arab Spring that marginalization and socio-economic problems have 
weakened the Syrian regime’s political base to a tipping point.219 
2. Authoritarian 
Just as the Nazis are the worst the world knows of fascism, the Baathists are the 
scourge of the Pan-Arab movement. In Syria, the Baath party ruled through the 1960s 
consolidating power of the Alawite-minority over the Sunni-majority until a military coup 
in 1970 placed Hafiz al-Assad in power.220 As a minority Alwite, the Assad family 
prefaced the coup by populating the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) officer corps 
with Alawites.221 After seizing power, Assad continued to institutionalized the Ba’ath 
party in the Syrian bureaucracy, while reversing any progressive policies the Baath party 
had undertaken in the 1960s.222 Assad embarked on creating one of the most authoritarian 
governments in the Middle East. Lisa Weeden described the Hafiz al-Assad regime as a 
“cult of Assad” that sought to control all material resources, every aspect of the state, and 
even the symbolic world of Syrian society by promoting Assad as omnipresent and 
omniscient.223  
The average DPR for Syria between 1975–2009 was 2.3, firmly placing the country 
amongst the most authoritarian states in the world. By the 1980s, three intuitions 
characterized the Syrian regime: (1) the Ba’th party dominated the political sphere in Syria; 
(2) the military formed the central power base within the country’s leadership and also 
protects the government from internal threats; and (3) the security apparatus in the country 
led by mainly Allawi security chiefs guaranteed the allegiance of the Syrian people.224  
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Syria had become a mukhabarat state of the Middle East, where the web of intelligence 
services and elite military units control the population to defend against perceived domestic 
and foreign threats at the cost of fundamental human rights and individual liberties.225  
Hafiz al-Assad’s merciless rule seemed to know no bounds. Thomas Friedman’s 
first-hand account of visiting Syria after the 1982 massacre of Hama gives insight into the 
extent the regime was willing to ensure Assad’s rule. Friedman described “a sea of broken 
homes” with walls still stained with blood months after the government massacred 10,000-
25,000 of its citizens (mostly Sunni Arabs) in the brutal crackdown.226 This event typifies 
Hafiz al-Assad’s brutal rule, willing to destroy a city to preserve his political position. The 
massacre that went mostly unnoticed by the world would be an ominous foreshadowing of 
life under Bashar al-Assad decades later. 
The future of Syria came to a critical crossroads when Bashar al-Assad took power 
after the death of his father in 2000. Even before his ascent to power, Syrians already 
referred to the younger Assad as “The Hope” representing the expectation that the 34-year 
old would usher in a new era or progressive and inclusive reforms.227 The DPR for Syria 
between 2000 and 2009 remained virtually unchanged, demonstrating that any “hope” was 
only aspirational. Assad’s promised reforms dubbed the “Damascus Spring” were struck 
down by the old vestiges of Hafiz al-Assad regime, which warned Bashar of the dangers 
of liberalizing.228 It was then no surprise the Arab Spring was met with state-sponsored 
violence by the Assad regime – Hama 1982 revisited.  
3. Political Cultures of Opposition 
Arab Spring-inspired protests hit Syria in February 2011, including the self-
immolation of a Syrian in al-Hasaka, but did not rise to level collective action as seen in 
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Egypt and Tunisia until the country experienced its own cataclysmic event.229 In early 
March 2011, a group of school children was arrested by the Syrian secret police for anti-
regime graffiti in the impoverished city of Deraa, imprisoned in Damascus, and allegedly 
tortured. Family members of the children started a protest to demand their release, which 
promoted security forces to fired live rounds, killing four civilians. Following protests 
swelled to over 20,000 frustrated Syrians, and before long protests spread to Homs, Hama, 
Latakia, and Deir Ez-Zor, resulting in increased levels of violence by the regime against 
the protesters.230 The first UN-commissioned report on the situation in Syria estimated the 
government killed over 3,500 civilians between March and November 2011 with Homs, 
Hama, and Deraa being hit hardest back the government crackdown.231 With each passing 
month, the civilian death toll would grow, but so would the opposition to the Syrian regime.  
A broad, anti-Assad coalition emerged out of the initial months of the Arab Spring 
protests. A looming crisis for the Assad regime had finally come to fruition – the Alawite-
dominated government was losing control over the predominantly Sunni-Arab population. 
Both non-violent opposition parties and militant groups formed to counter the Assad 
regime by late 2011. Four main non-violent opposition groups emerged, the Syrian 
Revolution General Commission (SRGC), the Local Coordinating Committees (LCC), the 
Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union (SRCU), and the National Council of Syria (NCS) 
coordinated non-violent protest activities and lobbied for international support through the 
heavy use of social media.232 These groups provided political context and organizational 
efforts that gave the revolution legitimacy beyond the borders of Syria. In November 2012, 
a summit in Doha, Qatar, codified the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces, or just the Syrian National Coalition. The Syrian National Council 
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brought representatives together from the SRGC, LCC, and NCS, gaining immense 
international recognition as the legit representative of the Syrian people, while also 
providing political representation for the FSA for the first time.233  
The militant side of the Syrian opposition grew out of local community-focused 
militias that slowly consolidated into the loosely-organized FSA.234 Defections within the 
ranks of the SAA, which is predominantly Sunni-Arab, fueled the opposition. Reports show 
the 150,000-strong SAA was reduced in combat-strength by two-thirds with estimates 
ranging from 60,000-100,000 soldiers defecting between 2011–2014.235 The SAA was a 
key component ensuring Assad’s right to rule, so the defections had a profound impact on 
the country and helped plunge Syria into civil war. Another study, showed that within the 
government, the overwhelming majority of high-level defections came from the military 
and security apparatus (83), followed by diplomats (14), parliament (4), and Assad’s 
cabinet with the least (3) to defect in the first year of the uprising (see Figure 8).236  
According to Aron Lund, the FSA underwent a major organizational effort in 2013 
when Brigadier General Salim Idris attempt to co-opt a large number of opposition groups 
under the Supreme Military Council (SMC), backed by the Syrian National Coalition, to 
create a single channel for arms and funding.237 Despite these efforts, the SMC was mostly 
ineffective in its goal as opposition leaders under the SMC retained operational control of 
their fighters and still had access to foreign support, thus reducing the dependence on the 
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SMC.238 Another explanation of why the SMC struggled to control the hundreds of named 
opposition groups was because of ideologic differences.239  
Thousands around the world answered the call to jihad by AQ clerics.240 Foreign 
fighters helped swell the ranks of AQ-syndicate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), which later split in 
late 2013 and formed ISIS. A 2016 report described the 90,000-strong Syrian opposition 
(excluding the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force) as divided between four major 
ideologies; transnational Salafi-jihadists, national Salafi-jihadists, political Islamists, and 
secularists.241 Not only does the composition of the ideologically aligned fighters vary by 
front (see Figure 9), but external support from western countries, Turkey, Jordan, and the 
GCC promoted competition amongst the groups. The report points to external support 
combined with ideological differences are the principal reasons the Syrian opposition from 
was unable to coordinating effective, large-scale operations against the Syrian regime.242  
The explanation of competing ideologies is in line with Lund’s conclusion on the 
matter. He explains that the most powerful groups (the national Salafist-Jihadists from the 
Syrian Islamic Front, the transnational Salafi-jihadists from JN and ISIS, and the Syrian 
Kurds of the Peoples Protective Unit (YPG)) all oppose the SMC and remain the biggest 
obstacle to establishing an effective armed opposition against Assad. This idea is also 
supported by a RAND study that points to both heavy reliance on foreign support and the 
use of foreign fighters being troublesome for insurgencies because the original goals and 
objectives of the insurgency can be altered if they fall outside of the interest of the foreign 
powers.243  
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Sectarianism undoubtedly played a role in the fractured state of the Syrian 
opposition. However, sectarianism and civil war in Syria should not be confused with the 
“Sunni vs. Shia” sectarian violence Iraq experienced in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion. Syria had a pre-war estimate of nearly 22 million people, made up of 59.1% 
Sunni, 12.6% Alawi, 9.3% Levantines (Arabic-speaking, Christians), 8.9% Kurdish, 4.0 % 
Shia, 2.1% Druze, with the remaining 3.1% made up of Assyrians, Armenians, Turkomans, 
and Circassians.244 A study by Belge and Karakoç suggests that linguistic minorities are 
more likely to support democratization while religious minorities will not due to the special 
protection they receive from authoritative regimes.245 The study focused on Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, and Turkey, but the authors hypothesize their findings will hold true for Syria 
because of the secular protection the Assad regime offers to religious minorities.246  
The previous hypothesis from Belge and Karakoç supports Fabrice Balanche’s 
study titled “Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War,” which provides the most comprehensive 
analysis to date on how sectarian divides have influenced the conflict. Balanche describes 
how Christians, Druze, and Shia minorities have remained loyal to the Alawite dominated 
regime because of the immediate threat posed by Sunni-Islamic extremists and the future 
risk of an Islamist government if Assad were to be overthrown.247 Furthermore, Balanche 
indicates that the Kurdish population (that she estimates is closer to 15%) further divided 
the Syrian opposition by not joining forces with the FSA, but instead focusing on avoiding 
confrontation with the regime while simultaneously liberating ISIS-held land with U.S. 
support.248  
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Finally, cleavages exist amongst the Sunni-Arab majority in Syria that has 
contributed to the fractured state of the opposition. As mentioned before, ideological 
differences caused stratification amongst the opposition. Still, other factors played an 
important role in why a Sunni-Arab majority did not merely overwhelm the regime through 
sheer numbers. Again, Balanche provides valuable insight into the limitations of Sunni 
mobilization. Blanche points to the fact that influential Sunni businessmen and Sunni 
regime officials had little to gain from parting with Assad and chancing their position with 
a new government, nor did they offer an alternative to the regime.249 Furthermore, the 
Assad family had spent decades facilitating rivalries between the Sunni elites, which was 
only exacerbated by existing tribal and Islamic ideological differences.250   
The breakdown in the political cultures of opposition can be summed up by 
returning to Foran’s model. The diversity of the Syrian people meant the historical 
experiences and culture varied by different segments of the population. The Alawite rose 
to power in Syria after suffering centuries of oppression during the Ottoman Empire by 
first consolidating their power in their enclave under the French Mandate, and then by 
slowly penetrating the ranks of the Syrian military after Syrian independence. Once in 
power, the Alawites under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad carefully managed the Sunni 
oligarchy, creating a false sense of entitlement for some, while leaving much of the country 
subjugated to harsh rule. Religious minorities continued to receive special protection by 
the secular Assad regime, while Syrian Kurds remained all but stateless. A clash of 
ideologies, and the failure to effectively organize into one, unified coalition doomed the 
Syrian opposition to failure.  
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Figure 8. Defections in the Syrian Regime, 2012–2014251 
 
Figure 9. Syrian Rebel Powerbrokers by Number and Ideology252 
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4. Economic Downturn  
According to the IMF, Syria weathered the 2008 recession reasonably well but 
experienced a slowdown in economic activity with real GDP growth at just 4% in 2009.253 
  This report also showed a need to maintain at least 6% growth a year in real GDP to 
counter the 12% unemployment rates, and over 40% of youth unemployment rates in the 
country.254 A separate analysis paints a different picture of the economic situation in Syria 
after the recession. One report suggests the large informal employment sector (34%), 
government subsidies, and declining public-sector growth hid more challenges than 
initially thought for the Syrian economy.255 Furthermore, once unrest gripped Syria, the 
country lost upwards of $50 billion between 2011–2013, 85% of the annual country 
GDP.256 In other words, an economy already plagued with issues and stressed by a 
recession came to a grinding halt as the violence increased, and the government lost control 
of wide swaths of territory. 
5. World-Systemic Opening  
The revolutionaries in Syria received a tremendous level of international support to 
oust the Assad regime. Still, much like the fractured state of the Syrian Opposition, it too 
became muddled with mixed messages and conflicting interests. Despite the efforts of the 
West, Jordan, Turkey and the GCC, Russian and Iranian support was enough to undo the 
world-systemic opening. Even more so, the lack of any effective action by the UN 
preserved the Assad regime’s legitimacy to rule, striking the Syrian opposition with another 
decisive blow. 
Russia has long sought to reestablish its presence and influence in the Middle East 
to bolster Russian foreign military sales, penetrate energy markets, and to maintain a war-
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water port in the Mediterranean via Syria. In 2012, the Obama administration drew the 
infamous “line in the sand” over alleged chemical weapon attacks by the Syrian regime 
against opposition forces. John Kerry doubled down on the red line statement during his 
dramatic speech in August of 2013 in response to a Syrian regime chemical weapons attack 
that killed over 1,000 Syrians.257 Kerry answered a reporter’s question about military 
intervention against the Assad Regime, saying, “He [Assad] could turn over every single 
bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week…But he isn’t 
about to do it, and it can’t be done.”258  
Russia seized the opportunity to challenge the U.S. on the international stage and 
proposed an offer to the rhetorical response by Kerry within hours. Within weeks Russia 
established a mechanism to disarm the Syrian government of its chemical weapons, 
providing the ideal inroad into Syrian conflict with legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community. The event foreshadowed the dramatic escalation by Russia in 
September of 2015 when Russia initiated its military campaign to support the Assad 
regime, effectively closing the world-systemic opening for the Syrian opposition.  
Also, the Iranian government provided a significant amount of support to Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime. Under the hospices of protecting the minority Shia population in Syria, 
Iran ramped up the help of its longtime ally both through funding and military support. Iran 
deployed a cadre of its highly trained Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, along with a 
large contingent of Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) fighters, and other Shia militias raised from 
the region to augment Assad’s dwindling army.259  Iran has spent billions on propping up 
the Assad regime to protect its strategic position to supply arms and equipment to LH in 
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its effort to undermine Israel, while also hedging against a post-civil War Syria ruled by 
the Sunni majority.260  
The UN has struggled at adverting the growing humanitarian crisis in Syria. 
According to Reuters, Russia has vetoed 13 UNSC resolutions to bring resolution to the 
conflict, while China has vetoed seven resolutions between 2011 and 2019.261 The Syrian 
regime remains the legitimate government of Syria in the eyes of the UN, exploiting a 
loophole in the liberal international world order. By maintaining the good favor of Russia, 
the Syrian regime has avoided military intervention under the UNSC. Annie Sparrow’s 
commentary on the UN relationship with the Syrian regime points to an even more 
troubling suggestion that the Syrian government has effectively hijacked the UN’s most 
expensive humanitarian aid campaign to fuel its war effort.262 Sparrow details how Assad 
controls all humanitarian aid and funds that enter Syria and profits from preferred contracts, 
taxing aid workers, and manipulating currency exchanges.263 With support from Iran and 
Russia, combined with the exploitation of UN humanitarian aid, Syria has successfully 
evaded much of the pressure that the UN economic sanctions were supposed to impose.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored three separate cases of the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, 
and Syria. The first was an example of a successful social revolution, the second a political 
revolution, and the third a failed attempt at revolution. The in-depth analysis further 
supports the validity of the application of Foran’s model to the Arab Spring but also derived 
three main topics to test Hypothesis 2 in a case study comparison in the final chapter. 
Neoliberal economic policies, social media, and Islamist groups were all revealed by the 
case studies to play important roles in the revolutionary situations during the Arab Spring. 
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The next chapter will explore if these factors account for why the success of the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia did not produce similar results in Egypt and Syria. In addition, the 
relevance of this research to the future of the MENA, and the application of this research 
to military doctrine are discussed in separate sections. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
This thesis has quantified the outcome of the Arab Spring by examining the effect 
the Arab Spring-inspired events had on the democratic polity of 15 countries in the MENA, 
analyzed five causal factors of revolution using fsQCA, and provided detailed case studies 
of Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. The results of Chapter III lend support to the first hypothesis, 
finding that all five of the traits of Foran’s model were present in the successful social 
revolution in Tunisia, and one or more were absent in the other 14 cases. The final chapter 
is divided into three sections. The first section compares the case studies of Chapter IV and 
shows that they lend support the second hypothesis: namely, that additional factors account 
for why the Arab Spring spread but was ultimately unsuccessful in Egypt and Syria. The 
second section connects the relevancy of the research to the future of the MENA. Finally, 
the last section ties in the military aspect of the study by providing recommendations for 
the application of revolution and social movement theory to U.S. military doctrine.  
A. CASE STUDY COMPARISON  
The self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi marked the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in the MENA. While this polarizing event sparked the 
revolution in Tunisia, the case study comparison found that the death of Bouazizi was a 
contributing event to unrest in Egypt and Syria, but these countries had their own Bouazizi. 
In Egypt, the beating deaths of Khaled Siads and Sayid Bilal at the hands of Egyptian 
security forces motivated thousands of Egyptian citizens to join the growing Arab Spring-
inspired protesters. Syria also saw small, isolated protests emerge in solidarity with the 
revolutionary events taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere across the MENA. But 
it was the arrest and torture of Syrian school children that escalated the protests to mass 
collective action aimed at overthrowing the government.  
These events underscore the unique history between the relationship of the state 
and its citizens that manifested into unrest during the Arab Spring. Although different 
events were the catalysts for widespread demonstrations in each country, the events are 
linked by the source of the frustrations – the state. I argue that the economic downturn 
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made the least compelling argument determining casual reasons for the success or failure 
of a revolution during the Arab Spring. Instead, the effects of neoliberal policies by 
authoritarian regimes set the MENA on course for revolutionary situations by exacerbating 
the socio-economic condition of dependent development. The use of social media opened 
the discourse of these frustrations and reduced the barrier for entry to spread counter-
regime ideas, as well as served as a tool to organize mass collective action. While social 
media played an important role, I suggest it also triggered premature attempts at revolution. 
The analysis of the 15 cases reinforce the point by Foran that the political cultures of 
opposition and a world-systemic opening are two of the most important factors for the 
success of a social revolution. In fact, I believe the absence of these two factors is the sole 
reason why the revolution in Syria and Egypt ended in failure. In all three cases, Islamist 
groups were involved, but only in Tunisia did they integrate themselves into the democratic 
transition, while in Egypt and Syria they were unable to overcome the power of the state, 
which contributed to the fracturing of the revolutionary movements. 
1. The Effects of Neoliberalism  
Of the five causal factors used in this thesis, only dependent development and 
authoritarianism were found in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. In the MENA, these traits almost 
go hand-in-hand with Beblawi’s RST. Rentier-states control their natural resources and use 
the income from oil sales to buy consent to rule. The state controls who benefits beyond 
welfare to become rich off of the government-controlled economy. Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Syria vary from this typical model of dependent development in the MENA. Still, all 
contain the same elements of authoritarian governments that dominate the social and 
economic spheres through the use of robust security apparatuses and single-party political 
systems.  
Measuring economic downturn using real-GDP growth produced uninteresting 
results. As expected, the trait was present in the Tunisian case, but no correlation existed 
between an economic downturn in cases where revolutionary situations did or did not 
occur. The trait may partly explain why Egypt, whose economy faired the 2008 recession 
well only achieved a political revolution. I propose that the lack of economic strain made 
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the de facto powerbase of the Egyptian government less incentivized to accept foreign 
economic aid in exchange for democratization, whereas Tunisia did. While this trait did 
not inform the research beyond that conjecture, it did lead to another idea; what impact did 
economic policies have on the Arab Spring? 
Starting in the 1980s, the World Bank and IMF incentivized neoliberalization 
policies in developing countries that were designed to lessen state control of economies 
and encourage inclusive free-market growth.264 A landmark study on inequality in the 
Middle East found the region has the highest level of inequality in the world, with 64% of 
wealth concertation among just 10% of the population as of 2018.265 Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Syria were among the many who bought into the neoliberalization policies of the World 
Bank and IMF, but economic and social inequality remained rampant, so what happened? 
One explanation lies with how the World Bank measures poverty and inequality. Contrary 
to the previously mentioned report in inequality, Ray Bush points out the World Bank 
would have you believe that the MENA is actually one of the most equal parts of the world 
with low levels of poverty.266 Bush cites the use of state-controlled statistics, insignificant 
sampling techniques, the misleading Gini coefficient, and Islamic-based welfare programs 
all contribute to the mischaracterization of the real socio-economic problems in the 
MENA.267 If the World Bank and IMF could not accurately assess the economic problems 
in the MENA, how could they offer solutions to problems they did not understand in the 
first place? 
As a result, the neoliberalization policies have encouraged the socio-economic 
problem of dependent development to flourish in the MENA, contributing to the grievances 
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of the Arab Spring protesters. Since the privatization of public companies at the 
cornerstone of neoliberalism was a function of the state, it became a new tool for Arab 
regimes to patronize and control the elite-class.268 In Egypt, after the IMF, World Bank, 
and the U.S. forgave a significant amount of debt and promised to reform the Egyptian 
economy in the 1990s, by 2010, only a select few prospered from the booming 
economy.269 In Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime used the neoliberal measures as a cover to 
develop the mafia-like Trabelsi-Ben Ali business empire.270 The planned liberalization of 
the Syrian economy in the 1990s, followed by the succession of the “progressive” Bashar 
al-Assad to power in 2001 have brought no new inclusive-growth or a reduction of 
inequality in Syria. 
The concept of “global cities,” like Abu Dhabi, has spread across the MENA, 
resulting in private investments in cities like Tunis, Cairo, and Damascus focused on 
wealthy investors and tourists, instead of investing in the needs of the ordinary citizen.271 
This does not suggest the globalized world economy does not have room for the MENA, 
nor is the MENA incompatible with a free-market economy. Rather, the idea that one can 
liberalize an autocratic regime purely through economic incentives is abjectly flawed. To 
sum up the effect of neoliberalism in the MENA, I return to Bush’s study, where he claims 
“poverty occurs not because of a failure to be integrated into the national or local or 
international economy...the poor are poor precisely because of their incorporation.”272 
Should it be no surprise an economic-system based on the guarantee of individual freedom 
and self-determination be manipulated by self-serving autocratic governments who 
guarantee no freedoms? The promises of neoliberalization were overshadowed by the 
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agency of the state and ultimately amplified the social stratification caused by dependent 
development.  
2. The Role of Social Media 
The case studies revealed the widespread use of social media by revolutionaries in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria to spread counter-regime messages and organize mass collective 
action. The emergence of social media in the context of revolution has been the subject of 
debate over its importance; has the media attached too much importance to social media 
like Time’s “Facebook Revolution” characterization of the Egyptian case? I offer there is 
no evidence that the use of social media was either a necessary or sufficient trait for success 
or failure in the Arab Spring cases, but it did play a role as a mobilizing structure in 
collective action against the state in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. In a broader context, social 
media helped spread an idea of revolution against the authoritative and monarchal regimes 
in the MENA. Still, the absence of the one or more of the five causal factors from Foran’s 
model meant the revolution attempts were premature. In other words, conditions were 
conducive for a social revolution in Tunisia, but not in the other 14 cases of the Arab 
Spring, supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Social media provides a new way for people to communicate ideas in real-time with 
a broad audience, either in closed groups or in the public domain. Social media combines 
new technology (internet) and a concept for individuals to share their ideas to a broad 
audience. This is similar to how mass media was made possible through the advent of new 
technology (printing press, radio, television) and the concept of targeting a broad audience. 
What dynamics of the past changed with the use of social media during revolutions in the 
21st century? 
During the nescient phase of the American Revolution, ideas were spread through 
writings and face-to-face contact. Personal interaction was vitally important to the success 
of the revolution. A social network analysis found that if it were not for the American 
patriots Joseph Warren and Paul Revere’s participation in social groups and secret 
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organizations, the revolution might have never coalesced into a broader movement.273 
Plainly put, the entire American Revolution may have hinged upon just two individuals 
staying connected and bridging the gap between the different social circles needed to unite 
a cross-class coalition. Lisa Anderson reminded us in a Foreign Affairs article that the Arab 
Spring mirrors the uprisings in Egypt and Libya of 1919 against the British when news 
traveled by telegram.274 While the advent of the telegram and telephone in the 19th century 
represented a massive leap in how fast communication humans could communicate, it was 
mass communication that would have a profound impact on revolutions in the latter 20th 
century. A ground-breaking study by Camber Warren found the density and robustness of 
mass media in a state was the single most significant barrier for an insurgency to challenge 
the state in the 20th century – or more mass media equals more stability.275 Mass media 
provides a centralized monopoly on information for a state, but social media, through 
personal internet and cell phones, decentralizes the connection between information and 
society.276 Revolutionaries during the Arab Spring did not have to compete with the state 
over influence through personal connections or via mass media. Instead, an endless number 
of internet-connected individuals could spread revolutionary ideas, send messages to 
organize collective action, and share pictures and videos of regime violence to galvanize 
further support from beyond the borders of their countries. 
Looking back at the place of the political culture of oppositions in Foran’s model 
(Figure 2), the organization/networks element of the model connects social media to the 
analysis borrowing an idea from SMT. McAdam’s term “indigenous organizational 
structure” from his political process model highlights the vital importance for the 
population with a grievance the ability to organize into a campaign of collective action that 
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otherwise would amount to nothing more than isolated protests.277 Wiktorowicz explains 
the concept of resource mobilization structures where mosques, Islamic nongovernmental 
organizations, Islamic grassroots movements, and professional and student organizations, 
all provide ways to translate individual grievances into organized collective action in the 
Arab world.278 Now enter social media, a new mobilizing structure that provides a digital 
space for people to organize and translate grievances into collective action. The case 
studies revealed that in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, the oppressive regimes had penetrated 
the traditional mobilization structures that Wiktorowicz described previously. Social media 
changed this dynamic by providing a safe space for online anger toward the state to foment 
for years, which ultimately led to organized efforts by online users to translate these 
grievances into protests.  
The final aspect of the role of social media in the Arab Spring addresses Beck’s 
criticism of Foran’s model of Third World revolutions. This revolutionary wave aspect of 
the Arab Spring is important to address because it forces us to ask, why now? Countries in 
the MENA experienced times of unrest and protests. Still, despite the majority of Arabs 
sharing language, religion, while living under authoritative regimes for nearly a century, a 
revolutionary wave never materialized until 2011. Beck states that Foran’s model provides 
a very compelling solution for theorizing the Arab Spring, but it fails to describe the 
revolutionary wave aspect of the event.279  While it does not provide a mechanism to 
analyze the interaction of the independent variables between cases that Beck suggests is 
necessary, social media offers one explanation.  
Returning to the model’s five causal factors, the only trait directly influenced or 
determined by the revolutionaries is the political culture of opposition. As mentioned 
before, social media served as a mobilizing structure for collective action during the Arab 
Spring. Since the globalized and decentralized nature of the internet and social media, the 
mobilizing effect was not limited to one country. Patel, Bunce, and Wolchik describe the 
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revolutionary wave as a product of diffusion; the successful tactics and rallying cry of 
protesters in Tunisia spread to Egypt by way of the internet.280 First, the opportunity cost 
of joining a protest against an authoritarian regime decreases when more people join the 
protest and the chance of being arrested decreases.281 Social media played a pivotal role 
in this manner. Protesters were able to successfully organize mass protests in public spaces 
via the internet in Tunisia and Egypt.282 Next, the internet and extensive news coverage of 
the events in Tunisia and then Egypt demonstrated it was possible to mobilize against the 
government in their own country, and that the world was watching when they do.283 
Ghonim’s account of the revolutionary situation in Egypt supports this concept: 
The only thing that separated Egyptians from a revolution was our lack of 
self-confidence and our exaggerated perception of the regime’s strength. 
Yet after what happened in Tunisia, I thought the Egyptian masses might 
finally get the message and break the psychological barrier of fear.284 
This idea links back to the political cultures of opposition trait. Social media 
encouraged the mobilization, but the political culture was not conducive to permit a broad, 
cross-class opposition to develop. If we expand the analysis to all the cases, we see this is 
because of actions by the state, like in Bahrain, or because of ideological divisions, like in 
Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen. Furthermore, in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Kuwait, the opposition was not prepared to go to the lengths of overthrowing the 
government. Social media helped defuse revolutionary ideas from the success of Tunisia. 
Still, the spontaneity of the revolution not only caught the governments across the MENA 
by surprise but the would-be revolutionaries as well. In that regard, the Arab Spring spurred 
premature revolutionary attempts. 
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3. Islamist Groups and the Breakdown of Revolution
The case studies revealed that Islamist movements were an integral part of 
Tunisia’s successful democratic revolution, while they contributed to the failures of the 
Egyptian and Syrian uprisings. First, the MB contributed to the fracturing of the political 
cultures of opposition in Egypt before a democratic transition could take hold and unseat 
the de facto powerbase of the SCARF from power. Second, a world-systemic opening that 
helped foster the democratic transition in Tunisia did not happen in Egypt and was unable 
to penetrate deep enough to support the Syrian revolutionaries. I argue that political 
Islamists in Egypt were unpalatable to U.S. foreign policy and threatened Egyptian-Saudi 
Arabian relations. Therefore, the marginalization of the MB was an acceptable outcome 
for both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, the convergence of several Islamists groups 
and their conflicting ideologies and benefactors meant the world-systemic opening that 
should have assisted the Syrian opposition became an obstacle they could not overcome.  
Islamist groups, whether militant, religious, or political, have long played an 
important role in challenging the rule of authoritative governments in the MENA. The case 
studies revealed that Islamist groups play little to no role in organizing and supporting 
protests in the early days of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunisia. Instead, they join the 
revolution only after the overthrow of the dictator was a forgone conclusion. Mechan 
explained that Arab dictators have long used Islamist groups as the scapegoat for political 
unrest, therefore, they were unwilling to accept a leading role in the Arab Spring until the 
outcome seemed favorable to their position.285 After joining the anti-regime movements, 
why were Islamists able to integrate into the transition to democracy in Tunisia, while they 
contributed to the fracturing of the opposition in Egypt and Syria? 
Islamists groups in both countries, the al-Nadha party in Tunisia and the MB’s 
Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, both enjoyed success during elections in the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring. Mechen attributes their success to institutional advantages over the 
competition through their history of charitable, educational, political, and religious 
285 Mecham, “Islamist Movements,” 202–03. 
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mobilization under the previous regimes.286 While the political Islamists retained the 
advantage, a survey conducted in the months after Ben Ali and Mubarak stepped down 
show a majority of citizens support a democratic, secular government (51% in Egypt, and 
66.8% in Tunisia).287 Apart from the institutional advantage, Tessler and Robbins attribute 
the success of Islamists at the polls despite a majority of voters disagreeing with their non-
secular agenda to the “mildly” Islamist principles the groups sought during elections and 
their length history opposing the autocrats in their respective states.288  
The success of Islamists did not last in Egypt, and the MB was ousted from power 
by the SCARF in 2013. The case study comparison points to one reason why Islamists 
succeeded in Tunisia and failed in Egypt; the de facto power base in Egypt remained in 
place while the old vestiges of power were dismantled and replace in Tunisia. The political 
cultures of opposition that came together during the Egyptian revolution fractured before 
a true democratic transition could take place. Wahdan describes the aftermath of the 
revolution in Egypt as “agencies fighting for survival and struggling to consolidate their 
gains.”289 This meant that once the MB threatened the power base of the Egyptian military, 
the SCARF felt it had to react to ensure its own survival as the real institutional power in 
Egypt.  
In Tunisia, free and fair elections determined the future of the country, and the al-
Nadha party found a way to survive in a secular-dominated Tunisia. Karen Piser argues 
that al-Nadha has kept actively worked to see the democratic transition through in 
Tunisia.290 She explains that al-Nadha has rebranded itself in a pragmatic approach of 
coalition-building with secular parties in the capital, but maintained its core Islamic values 
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with its support base in rural Tunisia.291 This is in contrast to the MB in Egypt, where their 
efforts to participate in the democratic transition were undermined by the SCARF. The 
SCARF portrayed the violence and unrest in 2012–2013 (particularly the violence that 
targeted Coptic Christians) as what happens when Islamists run the country instead of a 
secular government.292 
At first blush, it appears that the same world-systemic opening that supported 
Tunisia’s transition to democracy should have also have worked for Egypt. The key 
difference between the two came down to the resolve of the U.S. and the EU to actively 
support the transitional governments. The same financial and institutional support was 
offered to Tunisia and Egypt, yet while Tunisia enjoyed the economic incentives that came 
with liberalization, Egypt did not. Instead, it turned to Saudi Arabia for support as the 
Saudi’s were eager to separate the MB from controlling a neighboring government.293 The 
U.S. also seemed not too keen on exchanging the decades of stability between the Arab 
states and Israel that a secular Egypt had guaranteed with a chance on political Islam. While 
the Obama administration did withhold economic and military aid for some time, instead 
of further pressuring the SCARF and Sisi to commit to the promised democratic transition 
of the Arab Spring had brought about, the U.S. found a new partner in the Middle East.  
While the Syrian case cannot merely be distilled down to sectarian conflict, the 
unique ethnic and religious makeup of the country had a substantial impact. During the 
Egyptian revolution, the military remained intact and played a crucial role in determining 
the future of Egypt. After the Syrian regime decided to respond to the Arab Spring-inspired 
protests with overwhelming violence, the SAA also played a pivotal role in the revolution 
attempt through mass defections. The mass defections by the Sunni-majority army 
underscored the decades of oppression by the Alawite-minority led government and officer 
corps. As protesters were met with increasing levels of violence by the regime, Islamic 
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militant groups emerged as the forerunners in the Syrian revolution attempt that fractured 
the country into civil war. Balanche’s report on the powerbrokers of the 90,000-strong 
Syrian opposition showed that political Islamist s and jihadists group made up the majority 
of the opposition with secular groups accounting for only about 24% of the opposition.294 
Conflicting ideologies were certainly a contributing factor to the fissures that 
developed in the Syrian opposition. Still, a study by Baylouny and Mullins details the 
effects of the billions of dollars funneled to the Syrian opposition.295  In the study, 
Baylouny and Mullins assess that the billions of dollars in cash and military weapons from 
GCC state donors significantly outpaced support to secular groups making the Islamist the 
major powerbrokers in Syria.296 Furthermore, the lack of accountability and conflicting 
ideological aims of the various donors turned the opposition into a “virtual free-for-all.” 
297    
Similar to the Byman et al. study mentioned in the Syrian case study, Weinstein’s 
study on insurgent resource endowments supports the idea that outside support contributed 
to the failure of the revolution.298 According to Weinstein, money endowments from 
donors creates both recruitment competition between groups and money-motivated fighters 
that are only interested in short-term personal gains instead of a long-term ideological 
investment.299  Weinstein points to social endowments, such as shared ideology, can 
overcome the “resource curse” and encourage fighters to make long-term commits to an 
insurgency.300 The Syrian case with the conflicting ideologies described by Balanche and 
the Baylouny and Mullins study support Weinstein’s thesis that economic endowments 
impact the behavior and effectiveness of armed opposition.  
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The role of Islamist groups in the Syria case study proved to be an important factor 
as to why the revolution failed. Gregory Gause claims the best way to frame the post-Arab 
Spring politics of the Middle East is looking at it from the context of a new Iran-Saudi 
Arabia cold war.301 The groups served as the primary agents for regional actors to achieve 
their policy objectives. The GCC countries used ideology to coopt Islamist groups into a 
proxy force to fight Iran for influence over the Sunni-majority in Syria, while Turkey used 
Islamists to re-establish its place as a major regional power.302 The conflicting ideologies 
stymied the efforts, and the Syrian opposition was unable to overthrow the regime before 
Russian intervention turned the tide in favor of Assad and Iran. The world-systemic 
opening that should have increased the chance of a successful social revolution in Syria 
actually contributed to the breakdown of its political cultures of opposition and the ultimate 
failure of the revolutionary attempt. 
B. RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH TO THE FUTURE OF THE MENA 
In the post-Arab Spring world, inequality and authoritarianism are still rife in the 
MENA. The post-Arab Spring histories are still being written in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, 
where civil wars continue at a slow burn. This research intended to provide a post-mortem 
analysis of the Arab Spring to gain further insight into why only one of the 15 cases was a 
success. The information derived from this paper can provide insights into the future 
stability of the MENA, but in no way suggests revolutionary events can be predicted. 
However, revisiting the Foran’s five traits of Third World revolutions could give insight 
into the likelihood of flashpoint events emerging in a particular country.  
Also, this study explored the use of social media and its role in the spread of a social 
movement. What does this mean for future social movements and revolution attempts? The 
three cases examined in this thesis highlight the importance of social media as a digital 
mobilizing structure that helped coalesce the grievances of many into a collective voice 
against the state. While the use of social media to undermine the state seemed to surprise 
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the highly authoritarian states in the MENA, it should be no surprise that states will make 
every effort to control and exploit the use of social media moving forward.  
The case study of Syria highlighted the inability of the UN to bring conflict 
resolution, resulting in hundreds of thousands of lives lost and displaced millions more. 
According to the War and Peace database, violent conflict between states has declined 
since the end of WWII, with civil conflicts representing the lion’s share of battlefield-
related deaths in the 21st century.303 There is undoubtedly a connection between the 
decline in state-on-state conflict and the creation of the UN in 1945. The question now is, 
although the UN is accomplishing in their mission to “save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war,” can the UN take a more active role in bringing resolution to civil 
conflicts? 304  
The Arab Spring was also very telling of the evolving regional dynamics in the 
MENA. The extent of foreign involvement seems to be an important factor in 
distinguishing the success or failure of revolution in the cases.305 Saudi Arabia exerted 
economic power to decouple the MB from power in Egypt, while they supported hardline 
Islamist groups that fracture the rebel alliance in Syria. Saudi Arabia also sent billions to 
Jordan to help ease tensions created by protests, led the intervention in Yemen’s civil war, 
and supported the crackdown on dissent in Bahrain. Except for Libya, Tunisia seems to be 
the only case where neither the revolutionaries nor the world-systemic opening were not 
corrupted by Saudi influence. The Arab Spring caught the world off guard, and Saudi 
Arabia did not have the proximity or historical ties to assert any influence over Tunisia. As 
the protests spread, Saudi Arabia was able to formulate a strategy within its sphere of 
influence to assert its influence. It is also wholly reasonable that Saudi Arabia viewed the 
future of Tunisia as a minimal factor in their own foreign policy aims, and instead focused 
on the countries vital to their own national interests.  
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Like Saudi Arabia, Turkey became well-entrenched in the Syrian Civil War on 
behalf of Syrian opposition groups, while Iran and Russia have provided a significant level 
of support to the Assad regime. The Arab Spring demonstrated, except for the countries on 
the periphery like Tunisia and Morocco, that few countries can escape the contest for 
regional power in the MENA. If a future revolutionary wave strikes the MENA, the origin 
of the wave will have the best chance at success before foreign powers have the opportunity 
to corrupt the movement. That is, of course, if the five factors of this model are also present. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF RESEARCH TO 
MILITARY DOCTRINE 
As a military officer, I have spent years on the sidelines of the Syrian Civil War, 
unable to participate in the resolution of the conflict, buts still intimately familiar with the 
people and major players involved. For years, I worked alongside partner nations bordering 
Syria to foster a unified effort to counter ISIS. I employed Syrian opposition groups, who 
were willing to focus their efforts against ISIS instead of the regime, to provide stability to 
the region. The Arab Spring unfolded while I was an infantry lieutenant fresh off a combat 
deployment to Iraq. I had no idea the effects of the Arab Spring would shape the course of 
all my future deployments in special operations. When I undertook this thesis, my real 
intent was to gain a better understanding of the event that has had the most significant 
impact on my military career.  
Revolution theory and SMT provided the underpinnings of the analytical 
framework in this thesis. I firmly believe a similar research methodology that helped me 
theorize the Arab Spring has a place in U.S. military doctrine. Military planners involved 
with either UW or COIN operations need an in-depth understanding of the origins of the 
movement they wish to support or counter. Origins of insurgencies have been notoriously 
misunderstood in the past, leading to ineffective military strategies. The current military 
doctrine on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, FM 3-24, lacks a structural process for 
military planners to effectively analyze the origins of such movements. 
Instead of choosing from a prescriptive list of common reasons why people revolt, 
Foran’s model of Third World revolutions provides a way to unpack five interrelated causal 
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factors common to successful social revolutions. I propose that military planners could use 
these factors to frame a conflict to assist in military planning (see Table 12). The factors 
would be used to provide a general situation of a potential U.S. operational partner in an 
unconventional warfare campaign or support a counterinsurgency campaign plan in 
support of a U.S. national interest.  
 
Table 12. Connecting Foran’s model to Military Doctrine 
Trait Relevancy to military planners 
Dependent 
Development 
Provides context of grievances associated with inequality 
and social stratification 
Authoritarian Provides an understanding of the relationship between the 
people and the state; Provides context to the operational 
environment and freedom of movement for the opposition 
Political Cultures of 
Opposition 
Vitally important to understanding the ideology, 
organization/mobilizing structures, leadership, history of 
opposition, and cultural factors of the opposition group 
Economic Downturn Potential exogenous event that accounts for sudden 
mobilization of protesters or urbanization trends 
World-Systemic 
Opening 
Determent if the current geopolitical situation supports an 
opposition group to challenge a government; Frames the 
analysis of the potential effects on the opposition in different 
scenarios if U.S. or ally supports an opposition group; 
Analysis of the potential outcomes if other regional/
international players support or counter the opposition 
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